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This dissertation provides a contribution to the literature addressing issues in market
dynamics and its implications for the international transmission of shocks. The thesis has
been developed with the goal of building a tractable New Open Economics Macroeconomic
(NOEM) model with capital accumulation and international portfolio diversi￿cation.
In the past decades, capital and goods markets have dramatically increased their in-
ternational openness. Capital ￿ ows deregulation and goods trade globalization have made
countries progressively more dependent on neighbours. This tendency has provided them
with potential capability to hedge the risk tight to country-speci￿c disturbances, although,
at the same time, it has made them more vulnerable to foreign and global instabilities and
crises.
Over the last thirty years, the share of imports in US GDP has more than doubled and
worldwide trade, measured as the value of trade as a fraction of the value of GDP increased
from around 8% in 1950 to more than 15% in 1990. It is crucial to realize that a large part
of this enormous increment lays in the enlargement of the number of di⁄erent goods traded,
i.e. the expansion of the so called extensive margin.
On the capital ￿ ows side, the 1970s witnessed a remarkable boom to emerging economies.
This surge was triggered by the oil shock in 1973-1974, the growth of the Eurodollar market
and the remarkable increase in bank lending during 1979-1981. The pace of international
lending came to an abrupt end in 1982 with the sharp increase in world real interest rates.
Emerging countries were extremely damaged and almost excluded from capital markets. By
the late 1980s, there was a revival of international lending. This time, however, the com-
position of capital ￿ ows was mainly on foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.
Empirical evidence tells that the allocation of this international portfolio is, in fact, consid-
erably biased towards home equities, contrary to what optimal risk hedging behaviour would
suggest in a ￿nancial integrated world. This is usually known as the international equity
puzzle.
New open-economy macroeconomic models have become a popular way of analyzing
international policy issues, starting from Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(1995, OR from now on.) The
main advantage of these kind of models is that they explicit micro-foundations. The baseline
model di⁄ers from the traditional Mundell-Fleming in two features: ￿rst, all agents act under
perfect foresight. Households decide their optimal consumption path, asset holdings and
labour supply and, although there is no capital, output is not exogenous but depends on the
decision of leisure and labour made by individuals. Firms are owned by households and use
labour inputs to produce di⁄erentiated goods, which provides them with monopoly power.
Second, the baseline model assumes that purchasing power parity and the law of one price
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hold. Although prices may diverge from marginal costs, there are no restrictions to arbitrage
across markets or frictions on international ￿nancial markets. Hence, agents can hold foreign
and domestic bonds at no costs. Any variation in net wealth of households has an impact
on the choice between labour and leisure and, thus, a⁄ect output in the long-run. Finally,
money markets are fully segmented and only domestic agents hold domestic money.
After OR, the ￿rst relevant steps were developed by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and
Tille (2001), who provided a clear and useful synthesis of both. OR, however, accounted for
national markets imperfections and their international implications when the economies open
up (e.g. monopoly power,) Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)1 developed a deep analysis of other
distortions directly associated with openness: a country￿ s power to a⁄ect its terms of trade
by in￿ uencing the level of supply of its products, and explored the interplay between these
internal (introduced by OR) and external (monopoly power of a country in trade) sources
of economic distortion. Further completing the baseline literature on NOEM, and building
on both OR and Corsetti-Pesenti, Tille (2001) set the importance of agents￿preferences on
domestic goods. He showed the asymmetric substitutability existent between goods produced
in di⁄erent countries in comparison of that between two domestically produced goods. This
enhanced and sustained the claim by Corsetti-Pesenti on the power a country has on its
terms of trade.
The First Chapter of this thesis focuses on the importance of the extensive margin and
sets the bases of a model with which to tackle the consequences of international shocks in
scenarios with an endogenous number of varieties. Households prefer to consume a wider
range of varieties rather than a higher quantity of the same ones. Indeed, the chapter studies
a simple closed-economy model with monopolistic competition and endogenous entry and
exit of ￿rms or varieties and show how these elements have crucial implications for the
transmission of real shocks on national variables and welfare. The distinction made between
the productivity of creation of new varieties and the productivity of labour becomes crucial
for the results: a positive shock on the former causes an extensive e⁄ect on the production (i.e.
more varieties), whereas a shock on the latter causes an intensive impact. An increment of
the market size generates the entry of new ￿rms because a larger demand and, consequently,
larger pro￿ts are expected. Finally, a more patient population brings the economy to a richer
market in terms of the number of varieties, although it cushions the extensive e⁄ect in the
case of a shock on the productivity of creation.
The Second Chapter uses the main features exploited in Chapter I, i.e. the endogenous
1First version, Corsetti and Pesenti (1997) NBER WP 6307.
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dynamics of markets and the disentanglement of two kinds of productivity, and provides a
new benchmark for the analysis of the international diversi￿cation puzzle in a tractable new
open economics macroeconomy model. It builds on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote
and Perri (2005) and speci￿es an equilibrium model of perfect risk-sharing with endogenous
portfolio.
On the spirit of New Open Economics Macroeconomy literature, I use a simple model to
isolate, in an analytically and transparent way, the core mechanisms of international trans-
mission. The model is powerful enough to help explain some main international implications
of real shocks that had been only partially understood by previous research.
As in earlier theoretical analyses, some investment is enough to rule out e¢ cient risk-
sharing from terms of trade adjustment. Relative to previous work, here it is shown that
optimal international portfolio diversi￿cation is driven by home bias in capital goods, in-
dependently of home bias in consumption, and the share of income accruing to labour.
Most importantly, optimal portfolio shares are independent of market dynamics and nomi-
nal rigidities. Hence the model provides a more general framework to reconsider the main
result from the New Open Economy macroeconomics, in an environment with investment
and ￿rms entry, as well as endogenous portfolio diversi￿cation.
Finally, the Third Chapter sheds some light on the implications of ￿nancial and trade
globalization on macroeconomic volatilities. It addresses this question by exploring quanti-
tatively the model presented in Chapter II and carries the analysis for a two-country world
under two di⁄erent ￿nancial regimes: a ￿nancial autarky which is able to trade across the
borders and the fully integrated economy used in the previous chapter, where risk sharing
is matched regardless of the incompleteness of the capital markets. Moreover, I observe
di⁄erent levels of international trade in the form of home biases. I ￿nd that the terms of
trade and the real exchange rate experience grater volatilities when there is ￿nancial integra-
tion, whereas changes on consumption dynamics depend on the source of the shock, either
it comes from labour productivity or from the technology of ￿rms￿creation. However, the
link between trade and volatility, as in previous literature, remains slightly ambiguous but,
in general a positive relation seems to exist.
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MACROECONOMICS OF EXTENSIVE MARGINS: A SIMPLE
MODEL
1.1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the impact that the gains of productivity and population size have
on real variables, such as the size of ￿rms, the variety of goods and the total consumption.
Thus, it allows a positive macro-analysis of real shocks. Welfare analysis (see for example
Krugman(1991)1 and Berry and Waldfogel(2002)2) typically suggest that those variables
in￿ uence the aggregate welfare of countries. Furthermore, the present research contributes
to bridge international macroeconomics and trade theory. Although the two theories are
extremely interrelated, the former usually disregards the e⁄ects of changes in the trade
sector in taking the pattern of international trade and the structure of markets for goods as
given. For example, the exogenous shocks to aggregate productivity induce ￿rms to enter
and exit the domestic and foreign markets, thus altering the composition of consumption
baskets across countries over time3.
I take into account the existence of two sources of productivity: the ability of workers in
the design and introduction of new goods into the market and the common productivity of
the technology of production. This feature is relevant because, as it is shown, each source of
productivity a⁄ects the variables in di⁄erent ways.
To the best of my knowledge, these issues have been already analyzed by Corsetti,
Martin and Pesenti (2006) in the context of static models. However, there are good reasons
to believe that such e⁄ects may change considerably when intertemporal decisions and sticky
price setting are also included in the model. For instance, economic agents in the real world
care about the future when they take decisions, and therefore any productivity shock is likely
to a⁄ect future values of the aforementioned variables and, consequently, future welfare. Also
uncertainty may play a role in a⁄ecting the maximizing behaviour of economic agents and
thus, the variables of interests. I shall introduce uncertainty through some price rigidities in
the economy.
1He emphasizes the role of product di⁄erentiation on welfare in a spatial-economics context.
2They highlighted the market size as responsible for the creation of more (and of higher quality) varieties.
3See Ghironi and Melitz(2004) for further discussion.
1
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The main contribution of this paper is the incorporation of dynamics to allow for in-
tertemporal decisions and the analysis of business cycles in the framework of both fully
￿ exible prices and rigid price setting. I follow Corsetti et al.(2006) in constructing the
model. To introduce dynamics, I assume "time to build" of a new variety or ￿rm: ￿rms
incur in a ￿xed cost and need one period to set up an operational plant. Although, at ￿rst
sight, the focus on the closed economy set-up that I give to the present paper may seem to be
a step back from Corsetti￿ s research, this is, instead, a suitable and necessary intermediate
step to create solid foundations for my research agenda. Other authors such as Antr￿s or
Melitz also resorted to the autarchic framework before going into further details in some of
their open-economy analysis. The development of the closed economy, both with completely
￿ exible prices and, afterwards, with price rigidities is used, here, to observe the variations on
the number of varieties due to di⁄erent shocks on real variables and to the monetary policy
target.
The results of the present study agree with the main ￿ndings of the two-country version,
showing, once more, that the autarky set-up is a useful approach. As in Corsetti et al.(2006),
the distinction of two kinds of productivity (on creation and on production) is crucial. The
former increases production in an extensive way and enlarges the size of ￿rms, while the latter
has a negative impact on the number of varieties. A shock on the size of the population
generates an increment on the number of ￿rms, known as the "home market" e⁄ect in the
open-economy literature (i.e. a country exports the goods for which it o⁄ers a relatively large
local demand). The presence of the ￿xed costs generates dependence between the number
of ￿rms and the patience of households: when households are more patient, they save more.
Thus, the economy reaches a larger number of acting ￿rms. However, this cushions a shock
on the ability of creation of new varieties.
When I account for nominal rigidities, the economy is situated in a suboptimal point
in terms of welfare because, in comparison with the ￿ exible-price scenario, prices are higher
and number of ￿rms lower. The government is able to correct these imperfections by setting
a stance of money tied to the level of productivity in production. Finally, the consequences
of an insu¢ cient stabilization (i.e. a failure in choosing the suitable monetary policy.) are
commented.
Once the behaviour of entry and exit of ￿rms under these frameworks is clear, one is
ready to build on an open-economy set-up and investigate, not only the allocation of ￿rms
among countries, but also the behaviour of the terms of trade and the exchange rate, and
their implications on welfare. The comparison between the closed and the open economy
will shed some light on the channels of the transmission of real shocks in autarky and in the
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global economy.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview on the existent
literature. The next sections delve into building the main analytical tools in a closed economy
setting, covering both normative and positive issue. Section 3 establishes the general set-
up for the basic model; section 4 develops the ￿ exible-price version; section 5 incorporates
rigidities in the prices chosen by the ￿rms and deals with monetary policy and the problems
generated by an insu¢ cient stabilization; ￿nally, section 6 concludes. The appendix contains
some algebraic details.
1.2 Literature Review
Although there were some clear antecedents, including most notably Svensson and van
Wijnbergen (1989), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄￿ s (1995) Redux model was the starting point of an
outpouring of research on a new class of open-economy macroeconomic models. This surge of
literature incorporates a number of distinguishing key features: optimization-based dynamic
general-equilibrium modelling; stochastic shocks; imperfect competition; nominal rigidities
and evaluation of monetary policies based explicitly on household welfare. The presence
of a foundation in microeconomic optimization allows a rigorous welfare analysis of policies
and regimes. The approach also invites a rich analysis of alternative product, labour, and
asset-market structures, bringing international research closer to the complexity of the real
world.
Imperfect competition is a key ingredient in these new models4. Monopoly power brings
the equilibrium of production below the social optimum, which is a distortion that can po-
tentially be corrected by activist monetary policy intervention. Both nominal rigidities and
market imperfections alter the transmission mechanism for shocks. By addressing issues of
concern to policymakers, this new strand of research tries to provide an analytical framework
that is relevant for policy analysis. In fact, very recent contributions have sought to under-
stand more deeply the positive macroeconomic e⁄ects of uncertainty as well as the normative
implications for alternative international monetary regimes. As Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1998)
showed, important e⁄ects of uncertainty can compound or o⁄set the more obvious welfare
e⁄ects of variability, including e⁄ects on economic activity levels.
Empirics provide enough motivation for theoretical economists to go further into the
analysis of the consequences of the globalization. It is well known that trade has been
4Median elasticity of substitution has been decreasing over time. Thus, trade goods become more and
more di⁄erentiated. See Broda and Weinstein(2003). Furthermore, focusing on the increase in trade among
industrialized countries, Markusen (1986) stressed unequal income elasticity of demands that result from
nonhomothetic preferences: demand for di⁄erentiated products is superior to that for homogeneous products.
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growing faster than GDP for many decades. Over the last thirty years, the share of imports
in US GDP has more than doubled: rising from 4.8 percent in 1972 to 11.5 percent in 2002,
while the worldwide trade, measured as the value of trade as a fraction of the value of GDP,
increased from 7.9 percent in 1950 to 15.4 percent in 1990, a 94.9 percent increase5. Most of
the literature claims that the causes for this explosion in trade originate in three interrelated
sources: the reduction in trade costs, the relaxation of capital controls, and the relative
growth of many East Asian and other economies outside of the United States.
The new trade theory has provided insights for these stylized facts hardly explainable
by the traditional trade approach. Helpman and Krugman (1985), for example, point out
that conventional trade models such as the Ricardian model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model
cannot hope to explain these facts and go on to say: "These (...) empirical weaknesses of
conventional trade theory (...) become understandable once economies of scale and imperfect
competition are introduced into the analysis."
However, this vast literature called "new-trade theory" often disregards another simul-
taneous change in the economies: the US trade did not only exploit in terms of total value of
imports and exports, it jumped from a range of 74,667 imported varieties in 1972 to 259,215
in 2001. Hence, the introduction of endogenous entry and exit of ￿rms (considering ￿rms as
producers of unique and di⁄erentiated goods, i.e. one variety for each ￿rm) may represent a
crucial feature to capture the real world evolution.
On the theoretical side of the literature, although almost all studies predict that large
economies export more in absolute terms than small economies, there is no agreement on
how this happens. Models that assume Arlington (1969) national di⁄erentiation emphasize
the ￿intensive￿margin (i.e. a country which doubles the resources will trade twice as much
but will not trade a greater number of goods.) Monopolistic competition models in the vein
of Krugman (1980, 1981) stress the ￿extensive￿margin for exports (i.e. economies twice the
size will produce and export twice as many goods.) Hummels, Klenow (2002), for instance,
analyzed exports in 1995 from 110 countries to 59 importers and decomposed the greater
trade of larger economies into contributions from intensive and extensive margins. The main
￿nding was that the extensive margin accounts for two-thirds of the greater exports of larger
economies, and one-third of the greater imports of larger economies. Similar results are
obtained by Feenstra et al. (1999) and Funke and Ruhwedel (2001). However, Hummels,
Klenow (2002) widely extend the results of previous studies regarding the relation between
the largeness of an economy, international trade, and product variety i.e. they shed some
5See Bergoeing and Kehoe 2001
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light on the empirical side of the home market e⁄ect.6
Mangani and Luini(2004) developed a small empirical analysis with cross-sectional data
of the extensive increase in trade. To do so, they use an innovative source of data to
estimate the variety of goods and services: the registered trademarks (the Community and
the International trademarks protected by the World Intellectual Property Organization.)
The use of trademarks probably reduces the scope of the questions that can be examined,
but it permitted the authors to carry out a synthetic analysis of product variety. The main
result of their research was that, exploiting the mentioned data, they were able to verify the
￿nding obtained by Hummels, Klenow(2002,) that larger economies (in terms of GDP) not
only produce and export more in absolute terms, but also produce and trade more goods.
This implies that the strong relationship between larger economies and product variety
is important in terms of consumer welfare. However, the authors invite us to a cautious
interpretation of the ￿ndings because of the special characteristics of the type of data they
used.
On the theoretical side, nevertheless, the traditional literature always assumed that the
number of ￿rms was given or ￿xed. This fact prevented experts from studying accurately the
implications of di⁄erent shocks on the range of available varieties in di⁄erent countries and,
consequently, on national and international welfare. Broda and Weinstein (2003), through an
empirical analysis, o⁄er an extensive discussion of the dramatic consequences this traditional
set-up has for research ￿ndings. Notice that the suitable import price index for this kind of
models (without endogenous variety) is an index that does not take into account the changes
in the number of goods. Broda and Weinstein(2003), assuming that Krugman (1980) ￿ts to
model the US data, show the relevant mismeasurement caused by the use of an incorrect price
index: they conclude that the US welfare increased by 2.83 percent only as a result of the
changes in varieties (from 1990-2001). These gains from variety are 3 to 6 times larger than
the estimated gains from eliminating protectionism (e.g., Krugman (1990), Feenstra (1992)
and Romer (1994)) and around 10 times larger than the estimated gains from eliminating
business cycles (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)).
A few ￿new-open economists￿(See for example Ghironi and Melitz(2004) and Corsetti,
Martin and Pesenti (2006)) have recently begun to take into account this relevant charac-
teristic. This allows them to consider the relationship between the macroeconomic e⁄ects of
productivity di⁄erential and the substitutability or complementarity of goods, i.e. elastici-
ties matter on determining levels of production and allocations. Ghironi and Melitz(2004) is
6In fact, they found that countries with more workers export higher quantities to each market-category,
not at lower prices. This is consistent with a model in which larger countries avoid terms of trade deterioration
by enlarging the set and/or increasing the quality of the goods they produce .
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the closest paper to my research, on the open economy scenario. They di⁄er from Corsetti
et al(2006) mainly in three features: a) they endogenize tradability of goods instead of the
creation of new varieties; b) allow for heterogeneity of ￿rms and, thus are able to observe
idiosyncratic shocks; and c) they use a more elaborated mechanism to generate dynamics:
￿rms must pay a sunk cost to start their production.
Nevertheless, while our understanding of international economics has somewhat im-
proved, a number of challenges and open questions remain in the international macroeco-
nomics debate and continue to stimulate both theorists and empiricists in the ￿eld.
1.3 The Model
I develop a stylized closed-economy macroeconomic model. Hence, there is no external
trade in goods or assets. The economy consists of Lt in￿nitely-lived households, an endoge-
nously determined number of ￿rms, and a government. The only source of investment lay
on the start-up cost of every new monopolistic ￿rm.
1.3.1 Households


















where C is the index of consumption de￿ned below; ‘ is the labour supply which gener-
ates a constant disutility measured by k, thus the labour supply is endogenous;   is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution; and ￿ is the subjective discount factor.
Households can be employed either in the creation of next-period productive ￿rms -
with productivity vt- or in production tasks of the currently active ￿rms -with productivity
￿t-. However, they are homogeneous and they receive the same wage regardless of their
occupation in the economy.











where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Households￿preferences are as-
sumed to be stated over a very large set of goods, so that their utility is well de￿ned (and
increasing) in any new good introduced in the market, given technology and labour endow-
ment.
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The budget identity for the consumers is:
stIt + Bt = st￿1
nt Z
h=0
￿t(h)dh + (1 + it)Bt￿1 + wt‘t ￿
nt Z
h=0
pt(h)ct(h)dh ￿ Tt; (1.3)
where s are savings expressed as a proportion of total investment, B are riskless bonds
and, ￿(h) are the pro￿ts generated by ￿rm h. There are n monopolistic ￿rms, producing
di⁄erentiated varieties, i is the nominal interest rate paid by the bonds, w represents the
wage, p(h) is the price for variety h and c(h) is the demand for variety h, T is a lump-sum








5 = qtnt+1; (1.4)
where q(h) is the cost necessarily paid in order to create a new ￿rm today, which starts to
produce a new variety tomorrow. So st = 1
Lt due to the homogeneity among households.
1.3.2 Firms
A continuum of nt monopolistic ￿rms act in the economy at t. Investment appears
under the form of an exogenous start-up cost, qt, entrepreneurs need to incur in, at time t,
to develop their new variety, which enters the market at t+1. This cost consists in the wages
paid to the labour force allocated in creation tasks, that has productivity ￿t, i.e. qt = 1
vt.
Investment is fully depreciated at the end of the productive period, thus all ￿rms die after
two periods of existence.
Once created, ￿rms produce a di⁄erentiated variety with a homogeneous and linear
technology which requires only labour:
yt(h) = ￿t‘t(h); (1.5)
where y(h) is production of variety h; ￿ is the productivity parameter, which is completely
exogenous in this model; and ‘(h) is the amount of labour demanded for productive activities
of variety h.
1.4 Equilibrium
1.4.1 The Flexible Price Regime
All contracts and prices in the economy are written in nominal terms. Prices are ￿ exible,
thus, I only solve for the real variables in the model and do not model the demand for cash
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currency, resorting to a cashless economy.
1.4.1.1 The Household￿ s Problem
The representative household decides on consumption, labour supply and savings. To
do so, she maximizes (1.1) subject to (1.3). The ￿rst-order conditions are:

















Bt : ￿t = ￿ (1 + it)Et￿t+1; (1.9)
st : ￿tqtnt+1 = ￿Et￿t+1￿t+1nt+1; (1.10)
where P is the welfare-based price index and ￿ is the Lagrangian operator.
As regards portfolio choice, focusing on the equilibrium, there will be no borrowing or
lending, so that Bt = 0 8t, and each household will hold an equal share of equities, st = 1
Lt.
Notice that in the case of population growth it is necessary to control for it. This result
could be retained by introducing a redistributive scheme with lump sum taxes and transfers




Ta = T =
n Z
G(h); (1.11)
where Ta is a positive transfer for the generations already working, but negative for the
new generation that owns no share of ￿rms. This transfer program is self-￿nanced, so that Z 1
a=0
Ta = 0. The subscript a refers to the age of the individual.





which is decreasing in the number of varieties.
For simplicity, I assume the public demand of the government to be similar to the private
demand derived in (1.6) for each speci￿c variety, hence:









To solve for nt+1, observe that the last ￿rst-order condition implies free entry in the goods
market. It tells new ￿rms will be set up until the expected discounted pro￿ts of the marginal





















where ￿ must be interpreted as the monetary policy.
1.4.1.2 The Firms￿Problem
Firms maximise their pro￿ts with respect to price and labour and subject to the tech-












































Literature generally opts to parameterize for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
’ between 1 and 1=2. The suitable choice for ￿ is less obvious, but in calibration exercises
it is typically set around 1. However, values between 5 and 10 are also common. From now
on, I will assume that ’ ￿ 1 < ￿.














































































































The relation between the number of active ￿rms and the cost of creation is found using
this equality. ￿ >   is needed in order to ensure a decreasing e⁄ect of entry cost on the
number of available varieties. The reason for requiring this condition is that an increase in
the number of ￿rms, which will crucially a⁄ect the expected pro￿ts, generates two e⁄ects
on the consumption demand. First, the CPI falls, pushing an intertemporal substitution
impact (represented by  ), which consists of higher consumption today. Second, since there
are more goods to consume, households will split their income among all of them. Thus,
this reallocation of private expenditure among goods generates an intratemporal substitution
away from existing goods, which is measured by ￿. Notice that, under this reasoning process,
the claimed inequality (￿ >  ) becomes a necessary condition for the steady state equilibrium
to be stable.
Due to the existence of the in-advance investment, ￿, the subjective discount factor,
a⁄ects positively the number of ￿rms. When people are more patient they choose to save
more, buying ￿rms￿shares. Thus, the economy will be supplied with a larger range of
varieties. Obviously, the cost of creating new ￿rms decreases the quantity of companies
acting in the next period.
1.4.2 Firm￿ s size:
It is worth being aware of all the di⁄erent implications of a change in the number of ￿rms.
First, consider that consumers have a love for variety. This means they prefer to consume
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a larger range of di⁄erent goods rather than a large amount of only some goods7. So, in
principle, they may be better o⁄with more ￿rms in the market. However, more ￿rms means
more labour used in non-production activities. Each new company needs a previous ￿xed
cost which requires labour. Moreover, this new company will not supply a new good until
the second period. During the ￿rst period, the workers employed to generate ￿rms are kept
away from the production of goods already available to consume. Here there is a traditional
trade-o⁄: households must renounce present consumption in order to invest (with the ￿xed
cost) and enjoy more consumption tomorrow8.










ntZt is the quantity of workers not employed in the creation of new ￿rms at t. So, it is
the labour force available for the production of ￿nal goods in that period. Equation (1.23)
represents the size of a ￿rm producing at t. It informs that an increment in the number
of currently producing ￿rms, ceteris paribus, reduces the quantity of workers in each one.
Obviously, more ￿rms must share the same quantity of workers. If something increases the
expected pro￿ts for the next period or reduces the cost of creation, nt+1 is higher. Labour
force for ￿nal goods production is lost today to reach the new level of n; so Zt is undoubtedly
reduced. Finally, if people experience a larger disutility for their labour e⁄ort and decide
to increase their leisure time, either the total production per variety must be also reduced
or they must renounce future varieties. Z can be written as a function of the GDP (second
part of the equation above), although it does not allow to explain variations on Z. This is
because of the two simultaneous e⁄ects that an increase on ￿t generates: equation (1.23)
tells us that, for a given demand, ￿￿t would generate a reduction on the size of ￿rms due to
the fact that less labour is necessary to produce the same amount of goods; since n is given
from previous period, the unique instantaneous e⁄ect of ￿t improvement is via the reduction
of the price index, which produces an increase of the demand that completely o⁄sets the ￿rst
impact of ￿t movement.
7There is already some literature which deals with this consideration and explicitly separates the love
for variety from the elasticity of substitution. See, for example De Groot and Nahuis (1998) and De Groot
(2001).
8Another consideration may be the existence of economies of scale. In this case, the cost of opportunity
of enjoying a new variety would be much more important for scale ine￿ciencies. But this analysis is out of
the scope of our paper.
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1.4.3 Change of the Number of Varieties
Let￿ s di⁄erentiate the equilibrium condition (1.22) in the steady state de￿ned above,
take the assumption done in (1.13) and set public expenditure to zero (G = 0), then:















Notice, ￿rst of all, that the sign of the e⁄ects are crucially tied to the relation between ￿ and
 . Under the initial assumption,   ￿ 1 < ￿, if there is an increase in the e¢ ciency of the
creation of ￿rms, i.e. when vt goes up, the number of ￿rms also increases. On the contrary,
when ￿rms are more productive in their production process, i.e. each ￿rm is able to supply
a larger amount of its good h with the same quantity of inputs (4￿), this productivity
improvement disincentivizes the creation of new ￿rms. The reason is that a lower marginal
cost forces ￿rms to set prices according to it. This is translated into smaller pro￿ts when
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is   < 1. It is worth noticing the consequences
of an overall productivity change, i.e. d￿ = dv. Although the two shocks acted in opposite
directions, in the static model the dominant e⁄ect was unambiguously the positive impact of
extra e¢ ciency in new creation, except when   = 0. In this case, one of the shocks exactly
balanced the other. Under the present framework, this is not so clear. It is the relation
between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( ) and the patience of the households
(￿) that determines if the total e⁄ect leads to entry or to exit of ￿rms. Following the
assumption of   < 1 and assuming 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, the dominant e⁄ect is, as in the static case,
the improvement on v. In fact, this positive impact is stronger as ￿ goes down (8￿ < 1).
Hence, the more patient the consumers, the smaller the positive impact of a shock on the
productivity of creation. The intuition behind this result is the following: on the one hand,
when people are patient, they always choose to invest more; thus, in general, the economy
reaches a range of varieties wider than in the case of impatient consumers (notice that the
derivative of (1.22) with respect to ￿ is unambiguously positive). On the other hand, if
consumers tend to save more, their demand of each variety is lower and, consequently, the
expected pro￿ts are also lower, which demotivates new entries. If, instead,   < 1 is not
imposed the ￿nal result is uncertain.
A larger market size, i.e. larger L, generates an increase in the number of ￿rms9. Public
expenditure enlargement means an increase in total demand, so it also motivates the greater
range of varieties. Notice that ￿ is not present in the above equation. Monetary policy
cannot have any impact on real variables when all prices are completely ￿ exible.
9Remember I have controlled for L growth with redistributive transferences.
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To sum up, although most of the conclusions concerning the e⁄ects of the endogenous
variables on the number of varieties may be quite obvious for the reader, it is important
to keep in mind the crucial role of the explicit di⁄erence made between the two types of
productivity (v and ￿).
1.4.4 Changes in Prices
Di⁄erentiating equation (1.12), the welfare-based CPI, one can analyze how it moves








+ d￿t ￿ d￿t: (1.25)
Assuming again ￿ > 1, the more ￿rms act in the market, the more the price index (P)
decreases. It decreases more rapidly the larger the substitutability among varieties, i.e. the
weaker the monopolistic power of ￿rms is. A productivity improvement in the production
of goods also reduces CPI. The latter implication has been widely studied in open economy
models because it means that countries with better technology (i.e. more developed coun-
tries) experience a worsening in terms of trade (de￿ned as the ratio between price of imports
over price of exports). Finally, there is the e⁄ect of the monetary policy, which is positive,
as expected.
1.4.5 Steady State Analysis


































In the steady state, when ￿rms are able to charge a high mark-up, new entry is more
attracted due to higher expected pro￿ts. From the fact that there is (a kind of ) investment,
represented by the operating cost paid in advance, ￿, the subjective discount factor, a⁄ects
the number of varieties in equilibrium. The impact will be positive or negative depending,
again, on the relation between ￿ and  : If   > ￿ (goods are complements in the Edgeworth-
Pareto sense) an increase in households￿patience derives in a reduction of the number of
￿rms in equilibrium. If, instead,   < ￿ (i.e. goods are substitutes), as assumed here, the
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more patient people are the more they choose to save by investing in ￿rms￿shares. Thus, a
larger number of varieties is produced in equilibrium. On the contrary, as the disutility of
labour e⁄ort increases (￿k), consumers give relatively more value to leisure rather than to
consumption. Hence, the number of varieties is reduced as labour supply decreases.













































In the steady state, individual prices depend positively on the monopolistic power of ￿rms
and marginal cost, measured by k = w. The price index value is subject to the size of the
mark-up and the level of patience of the households. The e⁄ect of variations of these concepts
on CPI di⁄ers depending on whether goods are substitutes or complements. If varieties are
substitutes, a high level of patience reduces the price index: people work to generate more
di⁄erentiated varieties, which acts to the detriment of P.




(￿ ￿ 1) = (1 + i)(￿ ￿ 1); (1.31)
C = P
￿  = ￿
 




￿￿  : (1.32)
Consumption per variety is only a⁄ected by patience and the elasticity of substitution. From
(1.27) it is known that the elasticity of substitution has a negative relation with the number
of ￿rms in equilibrium (when goods are substitutes). As varieties become more substitutable,
people are more reluctant to work towards creating new ￿rms (and getting more of the same
after paying the ￿xed cost). Hence, they decide to invest less and consume a larger amount
of each already available good. This is the reason that ￿ has a positive e⁄ect on c. The
e⁄ects of the parameters on C are of exactly the opposite sign to those for CPI.









Notice the extremely simpli￿ed form found for pro￿ts. As households su⁄er more from their
labour e⁄ort, they will renounce creating more ￿rms and so pro￿ts per ￿rm will increase.
Instead, if consumers have a high level of patience, present consumption has a lower value,
savings are larger and the economy is able to support more producers in equilibrium. How-
ever, this fact reduces pro￿tability per ￿rm.








￿￿1 + n; (1.35)
= ￿
 
















The last equation of the steady state shows the labour supply level. When the population
becomes more patient, it obviously experiences an increment via the increase in n. On the
other hand, an increase in the disutility of work reduces the labour supply. For values of ￿
larger than one, but not extremely high, labour supply decreases with substitutability. This
is probably because of the decrease in the number of ￿rms (less creation). However, if ￿
becomes very large, then labour supply of each individual retrocedes. The reason is that, at
this point, the positive e⁄ect of ￿ on c per variety -which increases total demand and hence,
production- dominates the negative e⁄ect of the reduction of ￿rms.
1.4.6 Analysis of the macro-dynamics:
Let￿ s log-linearize all the relevant equations: ￿rst-order conditions, budget constraints
and any equilibrium condition to study the dynamics of the model. There are fourteen
unknowns, i.e. endogenous variables: P, p, n, C, c, s, B, G(h), ‘, i, w, Y , I and ￿, and
fourteen linearized equations.10 This system can be reduced to a rearranged expression for
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where $ > 0, ￿ > 0; ￿ > 0 for 0 < ￿ and ￿ < 0
Equation (1.37) is a ￿rst-order di⁄erentiate equation depending on the endogenous vari-
ables n and P, the exogenous variables v, ￿ and L and on constant parameters contained
also in $, ￿, ￿ and ￿.
Notice that, when the CPI deviates above its steady state value, it has a positive impact
on the future number of ￿rms. That is because higher prices are transformed in higher pro￿ts.
Hence ￿rms will take advantage of this deviation and will enter the market. Moreover,
consumption becomes relatively expensive with respect to investment. People expect that P
will return to its steady state value in the long term, so they prefer to wait for consumption.
If nt+1 deviates from n (above), at t+2 the economy tends to correct that deviation lowering
the number of ￿rms. It is worth observing the e⁄ect of v and L. Both exogenous variables
appear in two lagged periods (t and t+1) and a⁄ect in opposite directions. An improvement
on vt increases nt+1, but in a lower proportion.11 Hence, at t+1 there is already a high range
of varieties available, i.e. in deviations, n is at a level higher than the steady state value.
So, again, the negative e⁄ect on ^ nt+2 is the correction of this "excessive" value. ^ Lt comes
from the substitution of ^ Ct+1 in the budget constraint: Therefore, the impact is generated
by the deviations of C. If the population was low last period, today, people receive a larger
part of total pro￿ts generated by the existing ￿rms. Hence, households can consume more.
This higher demand gives incentives to businessmen and a higher creation of ￿rms at t + 1
is observed. So, the deviation in t + 1 is corrected in t + 2.
To analyze the dynamic behaviour of the main variables, it￿ s useful to organize the system
to obtain a ￿rst-order di⁄erence equation. Notice that the unique variable with two-periods
lag (a part from population) is the exogenous ^ vt.12
kn
$






^ vt+1 + ￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
^ vt + #￿^ ￿t+1:13 (1.38)
For the standardly accepted values of ￿,  , ￿ and k in the macro literature,14 the intertem-
poral e⁄ects on n are the following: #n > 0, i.e. positive deviations of n in t, increase the
number of ￿rms in the next one. The number of varieties in the market helps to reduce
the CPI, hence it is cheaper to consume and households agree on saving more to create new
11Keep in mind that nt+1 is decided at t, that is the reason why the relevant productivity of creation is vt
12A further (numerical) analysis should study the roots, considering L and v as parameters from the
characteristic polynomial, which, therefore, would depend on time. Here I stick to a simple reasoning about
the coe¢ cients of the variables.
13Check the appendix for detailed coe¢ cients.
14Standard macroeconomic literature usually sets  , the risk aversion parameter, around or below 0.5, so
that 1
  ’ 2. The disutility of labour, k, in a linear technology is around 0:75. ￿ is close to 1 and ￿ > 1. The
signs of the coe¢ cients in the equation are stable for a large range of values above and below the standard
ones.
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￿rms. Variations in the size of the population has a longer term impact. First, since ￿ > 0,
a larger population today encourages the creation of ￿rms in the next period more than one
to one. This is both due to the fact that there is more labour available and that expected
pro￿ts are higher because of the extra demand. On the contrary, ^ Lt has a negative e⁄ect
on ^ nt+2, lower than one, which helps to correct the excess of creation. ￿ < 0 and $ > 0,
once more, one ￿nds that the change on the variable has opposite intertemporal e⁄ects, as
it has been explained above. Finally #￿ > 0 for ￿ really close to one and negative otherwise.
A positive deviation on the productivity of production today will become in more varieties
tomorrow if population is patient, if it is not, they will consume more. In this case, they,
expect to bene￿t, also in the following period, from levels of ￿ over its steady state, so they
overconsume and the number of varieties at t + 1 decreases.
1.5 Nominal Rigidities in Prices
The recent literature on the new open economy has often been concerned with nominal
rigidities. It has studied them as a possible, although partial, explanation of the main
economic puzzles which, nowadays, confuses the experts. Therefore, in order to consolidate
the bases towards an open-economy analysis, I proceed to develop a version of the basic
model: I introduce rigidities in prices of the varieties in this section.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2000) argue that sticky wages and
￿ exible prices are closer to reality. Despite this point, if prices are set as a constant mark-up
over marginal cost, for certain applications it does not matter whether prices or wages are
sticky.15 The introduction of nominal rigidities allows me to analyse monetary policies and
the capacity of governments to replicate the ￿ exible-price regime.
Firms cannot ￿ exibly change their prices any more when a shock occurs. Instead, in
each period, they must sign contracts setting nominal prices for next year. To do so, they
15Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) show one example of when it does matter￿ in a closed economy
with both staggered price- and staggered wage-setting, the monetary authority can no longer replicate the
￿ exible price equilibrium.
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take expectancies.16
Prices crucially depend on expected ￿. An expected monetary expansion raises the price
level and nominal spending.
In the present model, the government controls the path of short-term rates i, providing
a nominal anchor for market expectations. A forward-looking measure of monetary stance,
￿ is provided by equation (1.9) and the de￿nition in (1.15).
1
￿t




In a non-stochastic steady state,
￿t+1
￿t represents the (gross) in￿ ation target.
1.5.1 The Firms￿Problem






























Considering the optimal choice of prices and assuming that the public expenditure is zero,
















16Today, a number nt+1 of ￿rms (matching condition 1.16) has been created. These ￿rms will start
producing tomorrow only if the price they have ￿xed in the previous period is at least as high as their
marginal cost, i.e.



















In what follows, one does not need to be concerned about this condition because it is never violated in the
present framework.
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where nr;t+1 is the number of varieties available in the market of consumption goods when






































In this scenario, the real variables nt and ct are tied to the expected behaviour of the monetary
authorities and the expected shocks on productivity of processes of production. Thus, the
credibility of the government becomes relevant in this context.
1.5.2 The monetary policy
1.5.2.1 A tool for macroeconomic stabilization
A government may aim to close the output gap and replicate the ￿ exible-price situation.
To do so, it should commit a monetary policy ￿ so that nr;t+1 equals nf;t+1, the number
of ￿rms in the ￿ exible-price situation. Once more, authorities may have to deal with an
important trade-o⁄: it may not be true that by closing the output gap the economy reaches,
simultaneously, the consumption of the ￿ exible set-up (i.e. while closing the output gap, the
consumption gap may remain.)
If it wants to reach the ￿ exible-price number of ￿rms, the government￿ s optimal behaviour
is to set, taking the CPI as given, a monetary policy ￿ = ￿. This policy rule consists of a
commitment to provide a nominal anchor for the economy and deviate from such a stance
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/143371.5. NOMINAL RIGIDITIES IN PRICES 20
only when productivity shocks shake the economy and destabilize marginal costs. By doing
so, the policy eliminates uncertainty in marginal costs and, with it, also in pro￿ts.
Now, it is necessary to check the implications of this monetary policy on output. After










































Notice that the government is able to catch both the output and consumption levels of the


















1.5.2.2 The Costs of an Insu¢ cient Stabilization
Although the desires of the monetary authority are to reach the ￿ exible-price situation,
it may fail in choosing the correct policy. What would be the consequences of adopting a
sub-optimal monetary policy? By addressing this question, one will be able to observe the
welfare consequences of macroeconomic uncertainty: insu¢ cient stabilization translates into
suboptimal prices and number of varieties.
Let￿ s assume that the authority incorrectly sets a monetary policy ￿ = ￿￿ where 0 ￿
￿ ￿ 1 (￿ = 1 would be the suitable policy for ￿ ex-price replication). For any value of ￿
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Uncertainty about marginal costs tends to reduce expected discounted pro￿ts. That is
because people are risk avers: they prefer a certain amount x of income rather than an
expected average income of x. In order to soften the sensitivity of discounted pro￿ts to
shocks, ￿rms raise the preset prices. Hence, the economy must stand up to higher prices17
and, consequently, a lower level of consumption.
Let￿ s refer to the number of varieties now. If the government tends to set a monetary
stance which does not completely o⁄set the productivity shock, the investors, who are risk




















































































￿￿  k1￿ :
To sum up, when monetary authorities do not manage to use the replication policy,18
the economy shows prices which are too high prices and a number of varieties which is too
low. The surplus of consumers is seriously damaged, both for consumption level -which is
damaged due to lower purchasing power- and for the short range of di⁄erentiated goods
-people do not satisfy their desire for variety-.
1.6 Conclusions
The paper presents a closed-economy general-equilibrium model with economic dynam-
ics. Both the fully ￿ exible price situation and the case with nominal rigidities in price settings
have been analyzed. Within this framework, it has been shown that intertemporal decisions
and uncertainty are relevant in determining the economic level of activity: a change in the
level of patience of the consumer moves the economy to another steady state, the society
enjoys more product diversity the more patient people are. On the other hand, when the
society faces nominal rigidities, the ￿rms tend to set higher prices to (partially) o⁄set the
losses they would su⁄er in the case of a negative shock on productivity (of production);
managers tend to create less ￿rms because the pro￿ts are not certain but risky.
The di⁄erent types of productivity shocks have e⁄ects of opposite signs on the extensive
level of production: an improvement of the technology of creation enlarges the number of
17This result coincides with the conclusion in related papers. See, for instance, Corsetti and Pesenti(2004).
18The suitable monetary policy which matches (replicates) the solution in the ￿ exible-price framework.
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varieties, while an increase in the productivity of operational ￿rms reduces the number of
supplied goods. Finally, an increase in the market size generates a positive e⁄ect on varieties.
In the present paper, as in most of the literature, the elasticity of substitution between
goods and the love for varieties are perfectly tied (in the set-up I present, love for variety
equals the mark-up of ￿rms). It may be interesting to relax this assumption and consider the
explicit separation of them. De Groot and Nahuis(1998) suggested that the disentanglement
of these two elasticities may have important implications on the economic growth and welfare.
Finally, it is worth stressing the lack of empirical research. The separation between both
kinds of productivity in empirics is a di¢ cult task. Debaere and Lee (2003) made a ￿rst
attempt to identify them separately, but there is still much work to do.




1.7.1 Flexible Price Regime
Pro￿ts expression is:








[Ltct(h) + Gt(h)]; (1.45)
where the ￿rst bracket on the RHS determines the marginal pro￿t and the second bracket
is total demand for this variety.




























The model may be summarized into fourteen nonlinear equations depending on fourteen
endogenous variables (P, p, n, C, c, s, B, G(h), l, i, w, Y, I and ￿) which, together, determines
the equilibrium. After using all of them, I can reduce the system to a second-order nonlinear
di⁄erence equation. This depends on n, the exogenous variables and parameters.
The BC depends only on the endogenous variables n, P and G:
















































The free entry condition becomes an expression which depends on n and G. Notice that the
previous period a⁄ects only through the ￿xed cost qt = k
￿t. With ￿ exible prices, CPI does











































































The fourteen log-linearized equations are:








^ Pt+1 ￿ ^ Pt
￿
;
(2) : ^ wt ’
1
 
^ Ct + ^ Pt = ^ ￿t;
(3) CPI : ^ Pt ’
1
1 ￿ ￿
^ nt + ^ pt;
(4) : ^ ct ’ ￿￿^ pt + ￿^ Pt + ^ Ct;
(5) : ^ Gt(h) ’ ￿￿^ pt + ￿^ Pt + ^ Gt;
(6) : ^ pt ’ ^ wt ￿ ^ ￿t;





^ wt + ^ ‘t
￿
￿ npc(^ nt + ^ pt + ^ ct);




^ Ct ￿ ^ Ct+1
￿
+ ^ ￿t+1 ’
= ^ ￿t ￿ ^ ￿t+1 + ^ ￿t+1;








^ pt+1 + ^ Lt+1 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
^ nt+1 + ^ Ct+1
￿
;
(11) : ^ Yt ’ ^ ￿t + ^ ‘t = ^ Lt + ^ Ct;
(12) : ^ Ct ’
￿
￿ ￿ 1




(13) : ^ st = ￿^ Lt;
(14) : ^ It = ^ qt + ^ nt+1;
where rt = 1 + it. Notice that, from government￿ s budget constraint, which is not allowed
to incur in de￿cits, Bt = 0. That is the reason B is not present in the linearized equations.
Proceeding to substitute one into the other in the above system of fourteen equations
in order to rearrange expressions for the free entry condition and the budget constraint for






































￿^ Lt + ^ Pt ￿ ^ vt + ^ nt+1
￿
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Plugging the budget constraint in the free entry condition:







































































































￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
< 0;
because ￿2 > n￿1
n ￿￿:
Now there is one equation and two (endogenous) unknowns n and P. So, a system is
needed to work it out. Remember that ^ Ct ’
￿











































￿^ Lt+1 + ^ Pt+1 ￿ ^ vt+1 + ^ nt+2
￿
;





























￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
^ nt+1;
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A NEW OPEN ECONOMY MACROECONOMIC (NOEM)
MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS PORTFOLIO
DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRMS ENTRY
2.1 Introduction
Home bias in international investment is one of the main puzzles in international ￿nance.
Investors tend to invest mostly in domestic assets, apparently without taking advantage of
the possibilities of international risk diversi￿cation. Placed in the border between interna-
tional macroeconomics and ￿nance, the home bias in portfolio has important implications
for economic analysis and policy-making.
Traditional theory, starting from Lucas￿(1982) seminal paper, tends to claim that in a
frictionless world with perfectly-mobile factors, portfolio should be allocated following perfect
pooling. However, when people talk about home bias in portfolio formation, the crucial issue
is: "What is the benchmark for perfect diversi￿cation?" It may be that a little proportion
of foreign equity is, indeed, e¢ cient.
This paper, drawn on Heathcote and Perri (2005, henceforth H&P,) explores the demand
for diversi￿cation due to investment ￿ uctuations in a Cole and Obstfeld economy. Indeed,
terms of trade (TOT) mechanism to hedge risk works only when there is no possibility of
intertemporal transmission of consumption. i.e. the mere existence of some investment kills
out the power of TOT in o⁄setting productivity shocks. It provides insurance only in a
"static sense". If households account for expectations of the future they need something else
to ensure perfect risk sharing: some portfolio diversi￿cation.
I build a new benchmark for the analysis of the international equity puzzle in a tractable
New Open Economics Macroeconomy Model. Unlike in H&P, I disentangle the technology
of the consumption goods from that of the capital goods. Second, I introduce nominal
rigidities in prices and provide robustness for the main result. Third, I introduce dynamics
to the markets.
The main features and ￿ndings of my analysis are the following:
1. First, I di⁄erentiate the cobb-douglas aggregator for the goods used in the creation of
30
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the ￿rms from that of the consumption goods. It is useful to ensure that one is not
overlooking the role of the preferences in this model. Indeed, I show that it is the
parameter tied to investment demand which deals the optimal bias in portfolio.
2. Second, I explore the interrelation between investment allocation and ￿rms allocation,
by adding the extensive margin in the markets. To do so, I assume that the introduction
of a new variety requires an initial sunk cost and some time to build-up the plant before
starting the production. I ￿nd that the allocation of the ￿rms -and so, the number of
varieties supplied in the market- is independent of the ownership of their shares and,
consequently, that the constant allocation of investment is optimal even with market
dynamics.
3. Third, I show that, when assuming a monetary policy which replicates the ￿ exible price
equilibrium allocation, the previous result holds independently of the price regime of
the economy. I introduce nominal rigidities in prices, ￿rst assuming producer currency
pricing (PCP) and then local currency pricing (LCP). In both cases, the optimal level
of diversi￿cation coincides with that of the ￿ exible price regime.1 The analysis of the
general case, which allows for any monetary policy, is a work in progress with Gian-
carlo Corsetti. When the authorities apply a general monetary policy, the endogenous
portfolio arising from the benchmark setup is no longer constant. A generic forward
contract with pay-o⁄s tied to the monetary stance and realization of shocks is needed
to ensure perfect risk diversi￿cation. By adding it, the same constant portfolio is still
optimal and, together with the asset, provides perfect risk sharing.
4. Finally, the role of the undiversi￿able labour income must not be dismissed. I agree
with H&P on its relevance and, like in their paper, the technology parameter (i.e.
the labour income share) a⁄ects crucially the degree of diversi￿cation, with a negative
relation. I stick to the complete-market framework2 and all my goods are tradable.
The optimal proportion of diversi￿cation resultant from this theoretical model is com-
patible with European actual data, for the parameterization usually used in the literature.
A bias on capital goods between 70 and 75%, an elasticity of substitution of 5 and a labour
income share of 2/3, implies a diversi￿cation of the portfolio around 33%-37%. EU-15 port-
folio in 2003 was 65% biased towards home equities.3 Concerning the bias on capital goods,
1Like in H&P, I ￿nd that a constant, homely-biased portfolio exists for an equilibrium with perfect risk
sharing, although my result di⁄ers from that of H&P.
2I write "complete" in the sense it provides perfect risk sharing, although it is not a complete market
o⁄ering a full set of arrow-debreu securities.
3Source: Bruegel estimates based on OECD and IMF CPIS.
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a large part of the literature agrees on the fact that physical capital is mostly bought or built
domestically. It is not di¢ cult to defend this claim: ￿rst of all, construction (of the plants
and some equipment installation) is almost entirely local and it represents a large proportion
of total set-up costs; moreover, equipment trade is tight to costs arising from marketing over-
seas, the negotiations for foreign purchases, transportation, tari⁄s and non-tari⁄barriers, the
distribution in foreign markets, adaptations to foreign conditions and standards, installation
in foreign production facilities, the need to train foreign workers to use the equipment and
the provision of parts, maintenance and customer service from abroad. All these features
make capital home bias even greater than that of consumption goods.4
The roadmap for the remainder of the paper is the following: section two provides a small
literature review. Section three presents the setup of the model under fully ￿ exible prices.
Section four gives us the equilibrium results. Section ￿ve introduces nominal rigidities. First,
I consider a monetary authority who uses an optimal policy to replicate the ￿ exible prices
equilibrium allocation. I analyse it under a producer currency price (PCP) regime and, later,
under locally currency price (LCP). Second, I assume a general monetary policy, following
the work in progress with Giancarlo Corsetti. The conclusions and plans for future research
are in section seven. The appendix contains some algebraic details which are not necessary
for the understanding of the text and conclusions of the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
The ￿rst question which is worth addressing is whether diversi￿cation raises the level
of consumer￿ s welfare. If this is not the case, the lack of diversi￿cation of the international
portfolio would not be such a puzzle but simply the result of agents￿optimal decisions. Van
Wincoop (1999) performed an accurate empirical estimation of the magnitude of these gains
and explained the main reason for which past literature disagrees dramatically on the ranges
where these bene￿ts fall. He found that welfare gains increase with the level of risk aversion
and that they are between 1.1% and 3.5% in a ￿fty-year horizon and between 2.5-7.9% for
a horizon of a hundred years. These are very large values. Thus, as Van Wincoop argued,
if potential gains are so signi￿cant, the natural question that must be analysed by economic
researchers is why ￿nancial markets have not achieved more risk sharing. One needs to
better understand both why investors do not take diversi￿ed positions in existing stock and
4See Eaton and Kortum (2001) for an empirical study on equipment trade. Notice, however, that the
analysis refers only to equipment and disregards construction. In the model I present, one must consider
"construction goods" to be aggregated in the composites for consumption and capital. Thus, the correct
proportion of capital produced domestically must be, necessarily higher than the levels indicated by Eaton
and Kortum.
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bond markets, and why markets that allow for trade in broad claims on national income
(macro markets) have not yet developed.
In Lucas￿(1982) seminal paper, households optimally split the portfolio half and half to
each country. They live in a one-good endowment economy. Baxter and Jermann (1997) went
a step forward and introduced production with non-diversi￿able labour. They conclude that
the international equity puzzle was even worse that what was claimed by Lucas: households
should go short in home assets in order to hedge the extra risk generated by the undiversi￿able
factor.
Economic research has moved in several directions to explain the home biased equities
puzzle which still remains an unexplained behaviour. Gehrig (1993), Brennan and Cao (1997)
and Mart￿nez-Garc￿a (2005), for instance, focus on the existence of informational asymme-
tries as the principal source of the bias, whereas Pesenti and van Wincoop (1996) found
empirical evidence against this theory. Another strand of literature quite in line with the
latter is that focusing on the costs of diversi￿cation as relevant investment allocation barri-
ers.5 It is also argued that investment may principally be an issue of control, instead of having
the scope of risk sharing. The concentration of the ownership of savings in a relatively small
number of individuals may be evidence in favour of this explanation. It seems that it is the
familiarity that investors have with a (local) ￿rm rather than the preferences on the aggre-
gated domestic portfolio that makes them bias their savings towards home assets.6 The role
of non-tradable goods was a well-known direction of research by the nineties. Tesar (1993)
showed that the high correlation between savings and investment, the low cross-country
correlation between consumption growth rates and the home bias in investment portfolios
are consistent with complete ￿nancial markets when agents face stochastic ￿ uctuations in
the output of non-traded goods. Consumer preferences over traded and non-traded goods
and over the intertemporal allocation of consumption may skew portfolios toward claims on
domestic output. Recently, some authors have expressed the conviction that home bias in
data is due to a mere error of misspeci￿cation (Coeurdacier and Guibaud 2005).
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) depart from the widespread view taken by most of the au-
thors that home bias is the result of market frictions or agents￿unoptimal behaviour. They
presented an extreme case where the lack of diversi￿cation was e¢ cient. The hedge of risk
went via terms of trade movements: any variation in the relative value of home output was
compensated by a change in relative prices, keeping nominal intercountry di⁄erence of con-
5See Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ 2000 for a view in favour of this explanation. They claim that trading costs
may be relevant if modelled right. See French and Poterba 1991 or Tesar and Werner 1995 for arguments
against it.
6See, for example, Kang and Stulz 1997; and Mankiw and Zeldes 1991 for a discussion on equity holdings
concentration on a small number of better-o⁄ individuals.
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sumption equal to zero. Hence, the e⁄ect of country-speci￿c productivity shocks could be
perfectly o⁄set through the international transmission. However, they limited the analysis
to a labour-economy set-up, missing the potentially relevant role of investment.
H&P and a small bunch of quite recent papers argue that the home bias corresponds to
optimal rational agents￿strategies for portfolio diversi￿cation. They go one step further and
include capital in the model. As Cole and Obstfeld did, they rely on relative international
prices adjustment after shocks as the main mechanism to ensure the diversi￿cation of risk.
Their main ￿nding is that a time-invariant share of investment on home and foreign ￿rms
yields perfect risk sharing. Their model is built on Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992, 1995),
assuming that households only trade shares in domestic and foreign ￿rms. They allow for
capital investment dynamics and imperfect substitutability between traded goods.
Finally, the recent paper by Coeurdacier et al. (2007) addresses three main stylised facts
on international portfolios and exchange rate in an incomplete markets scenario. The ￿rst
one of these empirical facts is, precisely, the home equity puzzle. They argue that previous
literature fails in accounting only for supply shocks. Indeed, they are the ￿rst to introduce
two extra types of shocks: redistributive and relative demand shocks, which produce a home
biased portfolio in equilibrium. They do so in a two-country two-good world.
2.3 The Model
The world consists of two symmetric countries, denoted by H (home) and F (foreign)
and an endogenously determined number of varieties, all of them perfectly tradable. Home
(foreign) country is inhabited by a continuum of homogeneous households who sum up to 1
and supply their labour to domestic ￿rms. There is no capital accumulation but only a cost
to entry into the market. Firms and agents are homogeneous within countries. However,
preferences are symmetrically biased towards domestically-produced goods. The monopolis-
tic ￿rms set prices ￿ exibly, by maximizing pro￿ts.
2.3.1 Households
Each country is populated by a continuum of households, whose preferences are de￿ned
over the consumption of nt+n￿
t goods: a composite of home + foreign ￿nal produced varieties.




t [lnCt ￿ ￿‘t (j)]; (2.1)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor and U (:) is a utility function de￿ned over the
consumption of a basket Ct and a linear disutility of labour e⁄ort, ￿‘t (j). The consumption
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basket is given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over the bundles of tradables produced in the






where ￿ < 1. CH andCF are CES aggregators over the n(n￿) varieties produced in the




















Here, h and f denote a speci￿c variety of the corresponding country. Households all over the
world ￿nance the creation of ￿rms in both countries. In order to construct her portfolio of
investment, the home household purchases a fraction ￿F;t+1, of the shares issued by foreign-
country ￿rms and ￿H;t+1 of the domestic ￿rms, which will start producing next period.
She a⁄ords her consumption expenditure and investment with the dividends received from
currently active ￿rms at home and abroad, proportionally to her current portfolio allocation:
￿H;t, ￿F;t and her labour income. The budget constraint is
Bt+1 + ￿H;t+1
nt+1 Z








pt (h)ct (h)dh +
Z n￿
t








t(f)df + wt‘t (j) + (1 + it)Bt
where labour supply (‘t (j)) is elastic, ￿ being the linear disutility for the e⁄ort of working;
￿t(h) are the pro￿ts of ￿rm h. An initial investment is needed for a new ￿rm to start
producing. qt (h) (q￿
t (f)) is the cost necessary for the creation of a ￿rm at home (foreign).
￿t(h) (￿￿
t(f)) are the pro￿ts of a single home (foreign) ￿rm in home (foreign) currency; et is
the nominal exchange rate (pt (h) = etp￿
t (h)), ct (h) the domestic demand for good h, nt is
the number of ￿rms allocated at home and wt is the wage. Bt is the international riskless
bond. Finally, ￿ indicates the home-bias on consumption preferences. The super script *,
x￿, stands for the foreign country.
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2.3.2 Firms
A continuum of n(n￿) tradable goods ￿rms in the home (foreign) country act in a mo-
nopolistically competitive economy. All of them sell their products in both home and foreign
markets. A sunk cost is paid at time t to develop a new variety, which will enter the market
at t+1 and disappear at the end of that period (full amortization.) This cost is ￿nanced by
issuing equities in the international stock market, i.e. both home and foreign agents have
access to shares of any ￿rm created all over the world.
Creation of new ￿rms
To produce a new home variety at time t + 1, entrepreneurs must incur a startup cost
of qt (h) = Pk;tKt today. Firms are fully depreciated after one year of production. Kt
is a composite good containing both home and foreign varieties following a Cobb-Douglas






where KH;t and KF;t are the baskets of home and foreign ￿nal goods used in capital. The
lower the Kt (K￿
t ) the more e¢ cient home (foreign) country in the creation of new ￿rms or
varieties. Pk;t is the CPI for the basket Kt.7 Finally, ￿ indicates the bias in the preferences



















with * on all the K and k for the foreign country.8 Hence, total investment at home is
IH;t = nt+1qt (h) = nt+1PK;tKt
Production
Once created, ￿rms produce a di⁄erentiated variety with an homogeneous technology
which requires only labour:
Yt(h) = AH;t‘t(h)
￿: (2.7)
The state of the economy is
fAH;t;AF;tg:
7One may easily have di⁄erent CES aggregators and/or an extra parameter of productivity for K in the







, where i = H;F and % stands for the elasticity
of substitution between capital goods, which may di⁄er from ￿; the elasticity between consumption goods).
However, the set-up presented in the paper disregards this alternative to concentrate only on the scope
explained in the introduction. In this case, the closed-economy version would have P = PK, since the unique
di⁄erentiation between C and K would be, by assumption, the Cobb-Douglas parameter (￿ 6= ￿).
8See the appendix for details.
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￿ is, indeed, the share of output going to labour. The (1 ￿ ￿), which belongs to capital, is
distributed among investors via dividends.Yt(h) is the production of one ￿rm, and kt (h) is
the demand of the ￿nal good h by new entrants to build up their plants. pt(h) is the price
of variety h which is ￿ exibly set by the monopolistic ￿rm and ‘t (h) is labour demand for
good h:
2.4 Equilibrium
2.4.1 The Household￿ s Problem









































where Qt;t+1 is the discount factor of future dividends and qH;t (q￿
F;t) is the country aggregate
of qt (h) (q￿
t (f)). Equation (2.8) is the endogenous supply of hours of labour; (2.9) shows the
allocation of the consumption expenditure among home and foreign-produced goods which
is constant due to the Cobb-Douglas assumption; (2.12) and (2.13) provide us with the free
entry conditions for new ￿rms. Firms will enter the market whilst the initial ￿xed cost is
lower or equal to the expected pro￿ts. ￿H;t are the aggregate pro￿ts of all domestic ￿rms.
Finally, (2.11) is the usual Euler equation, the intertemporal rate of substitution between
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is the intertemporal rate of substitution between the consumption in period t and t + 1.
Foreign households solve an analogous problem with symmetric preferences, i.e. they prefer
the foreign-produced goods, f, as much as home households prefer home-produced ones, h.9
2.4.2 The Firm￿ s Problem
Creation of new varieties:
During the creation of the variety, home ￿rms choose the demand of each capital good,















































where the shadow price, ￿t = PH;t = n
1
1￿￿
t pt (h) and ￿
￿
t = PF;t. The optimal baskets of home








Firm h today has a demand of variety h, to be used in building ￿rms, of nt+1kt (h). ￿ > 1, is



















where ￿￿ = ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿.10
Cost Minimization and Optimal Prices:
9See the appendix for details.
10The condition for stability requires that 1 > ￿ ￿￿1
￿ . See appendix for details.
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Firms choose the amount of labour which minimizes costs,
minwt‘t (h);





1￿￿ = mg cost,
where ￿t it the lagrange multiplier. Once operative, ￿rms maximize pro￿ts:11
max
pt(h)
pt(h)Yt(h) ￿ wt‘t (h); (2.16)














Prices consist of a constant mark-up over the expression of marginal costs which depends
crucially on the level of production, due to the non-linear technology.
2.4.3 Markets Clearing
The clearing conditions for the domestic and foreign goods markets are:
ct (h) + c
￿




t (h) = Yt (h); (2.17)
ct (f) + c
￿




t (f) = Yt (f): (2.18)
A ￿rm satis￿es four sources of demand: those of the home and the foreign households and
those of the ￿rms which will produce next year in the home and foreign country.
The labour market is emptied when:













￿H;t = 1 ￿ ￿
￿
H;t; (2.22)
￿F;t = 1 ￿ ￿
￿
F;t: (2.23)
11See appendix for details.
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/143372.4. EQUILIBRIUM 40
Under this non-linear technology, one can write home aggregate pro￿ts as a constant fraction
of total revenue, although this fraction is di⁄erent from that found under constant returns to
scale (with linear technology ￿CRS
H = 1
￿PHYH < ￿DRS
H ). This depends both on the elasticity

















￿ > 0. The amount of pro￿ts over total income is higher due to
the diminishing returns to scale in the technology. One can also write the labour cost as a




￿pt (h)Yt (h): (2.25)
2.4.4 Solving the optimal diversi￿cation level, ￿
Let￿ s conjecture that an equilibrium allocation exists with B = 0 and constant portfolio
demand ￿
￿
H;t = ￿F;t = ￿ for symmetric countries (Lt = L￿






i.e. where households get perfect risk sharing. So that Qt = etQ￿
t, stochastic discount rates
are the same across countries. Hereafter it is shown that this is, indeed, an equilibrium
allocation, by characterizing the associated vector of equilibrium prices, and verifying that
prices and quantities satisfy households￿￿rst-order conditions, market clearing conditions
and the resource constraints.
Let￿ s de￿ne the following relative variables in nominal terms:











t = IH;t ￿ etI
￿
F;t;
4U = PH;tYH;t ￿ etP
￿
F;tYF;t:
These are the intercountry di⁄erences in consumption, investment and output in nominal
12See appendix for pro￿ts aggregation.
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By taking di⁄erences, I have an expression for the output absorption in the economy.13
4U = (2￿ ￿ 1)4C + (2￿ ￿ 1)4|: (2.28)
The di⁄erence in nominal output is due to the di⁄erences in consumption and in investment.
The size of each of them in 4U depends on the corresponding parameter of the Cobb-Douglas
aggregator in C or K, ￿ or ￿. Hence, in the conjectured equilibrium,
4Uj4C=0 = (2￿ ￿ 1)4|: (2.29)
Let￿ s take the home and foreign households￿aggregate budget constraints

























￿IH;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I
￿
F;t






















F;tYF;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)IH;t ￿ ￿etI
￿
F;t
+(1 + it)Bt ￿ Bt+1
13This equation is the equivalent of number 27 in H&P.













































where PH;tYH;t is the nominal domestic output (U) and P ￿
F;tYF;t the foreign output (U
￿) and














￿ ￿|(1 ￿ 2￿)











Plugging equation (2.29) and setting the gross and net holding of bonds identically equal to









(2￿ ￿ 1)4| ￿ ￿|(1 ￿ 2￿): (2.30)
2.4.5 Derivation of the Terms of Trade




PF;t. One can derive TOT from the resource constraints. In the case of symmetric


































14This equation is the equivalent of 32 in H&P.
15See appendix for computations in detail.























[(1 ￿ ￿)Lt + ￿L￿
t]
h
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The terms of trade depend on the relative supply of output net of investment. Given in-
vestment, the international transmission is positive: an increase in net home output bene￿ts
foreign households by lowering the home output prices. At the same time, a positive pro-
ductivity shock at Home raises investment.
Let ￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)



























For ￿ = 1=2, households￿preferences are identical, the real exchange rate P=P ￿ is identically
equal to 1. In other words, purchasing power parity holds.17 For ￿ 6= 1=2, instead, home




























via Y z }| {
(2￿ ￿ 1)














To make the mechanism clear, let￿ s assume that a fully anticipated shock consistent in a rise
in relative investment occurs18 (i.e. ￿IH;t+1 whereas I￿
F;t+1 keeps constant.) First, consider an
environment where the basket of capital goods is biased towards domestic varieties (￿ > 1
2).
In this case, ￿ < 1
2.
17Cole and Obstfeld case.
18A typical example of ￿IH is the expectancy of a future increase in home productivity, so that agents
want to create more ￿rms to take advantage of such improvement.
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In brief, one can say that the ￿IH;t+1 causes a quantity and a valuation e⁄ect and these
disturb perfect risk sharing. The shock generates an increment in home households￿wealth
whereas foreign wealth decreases. This is re￿ ected on the valuation of home output via the
increase in prices.
I may split the overall impact into two simultaneous e⁄ects which move in opposite
directions. On the one hand, ￿| has a negative direct e⁄ect on ￿C. The relative demand of
home goods increases because they are used to satisfy the extra investment. Although part
of this cost is ￿nanced by foreigners through ownership (1
2 > ￿ > 0), the home household is
forced to reduce her relative consumption. This impact on ￿C helps to regulate the ￿nancial
￿ ows and thus avoids disturbing perfect risk sharing.
Notice that when ￿ = 0 (no diversi￿cation), the term (￿(1 ￿ 2￿)) equals ￿1. So,
an increment of one euro in domestic investment directly implies a one euro reduction in
domestic consumption because it generates a one unit decline in dividends received by home
households. By contrast, if ￿ = 1 (home households only own foreign assets) the direct term
equals 1. Thus, an extra euro of home investment generates a reduction of one euro in the
foreign consumption because it is the foreign households who ￿nance the whole cost of it.
On the contrary, the indirect e⁄ect, the impact of ￿U on ￿C, is positive. This can also
be separated into two parts. The ￿rst, (2￿ ￿ 1), captures the extent to which an increase in
domestic absorption (in this case, investment) increases the relative value of home output.





), re￿ ects the impact of a change in relative output on
relative consumption. It shows the fact that an increment in relative demand for home goods
has a positive e⁄ect on the terms of trade for the domestic economy. This e⁄ect is negatively
related to ￿ and positively to ￿. This is the case because, the larger the non-diversi￿able
labour￿ s share, the larger the impact of an improvement in the domestic economy￿ s terms of
trade on relative consumption, given ￿.19 Similarly, the smaller the diversi￿cation level ￿,
the larger the impact of a variation in relative prices on ￿C.
To sum up, when the shock is anticipated, home output has a higher relative value due to
the increment of the demand. In consequence, the distributed dividend, which belongs partly
to foreign households, is larger. The increase in the output demand pushes the quantity of
labour up and so the total labour income increases, making households become richer.
Indeed, the magnitude of this general equilibrium e⁄ect is greater than the magnitude of
the direct e⁄ect when ￿ (the proportion of foreign assets) is ine¢ ciently high and vice versa.
In order to compensate a situation like this and re-establish perfect risk sharing, ￿
19This is due to the fact that most of the revenue goes directly to labour, via wages. Real wages are
a⁄ected by the changes on relative prices. On the contrary, when a large part of the household￿ s income
comes from dividends, TOT loses its capacity of o⁄setting the impact of the shocks.
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must increase. Therefore, a larger proportion of dividends is redistributed to the foreign
households in order to get a smooth consumption. In this way home households pass part
of their wealth to the other country and, simultaneously, reduce the demand e⁄ect. The
latter occurs because, although they are importing more, these imports are partly ￿nanced
by giving extra ownership to the foreigners.
In the case in which capital goods are mostly composed by foreign varieties (￿ < 1
2 )
￿ > 1
2), all the e⁄ects act in the opposite direction. The direct e⁄ect is positive, whereas the
indirect e⁄ect becomes negative. This change is reasonable since the demand generated by
the extra investment, now, must be mostly covered by foreign goods and so foreign output
increases its value with respect to home production.
This result yields a basic conclusion: diversi￿cation is not a tool to redistribute the
purchasing power, but to control the excess of demand.20 And it is the existence of investment
which makes diversi￿cation necessary, because terms of trade are not able to neutralize the
consequences of the shocks.
By setting ￿C = 0 I solve for ￿,
￿ =
1 ￿ ￿
1 + (2￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿￿1
￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿: (2.35)
Equation (2.35) is the equilibrium value for ￿, i.e. the diversi￿cation level for which the
direct and indirect e⁄ects of a shock disturbing relative consumption (for instance, a shock
in investment) are exactly o⁄set.
Households allocate a positive part of their portfolios on foreign assets, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
Notice that it is not the parameter from the preferences on consumption (￿) which plays a
role in the diversi￿cation, but the parameter of the preferences on capital goods (￿). Hence,
it is important to disentangle these two, allowing them to be di⁄erent. This is not done in
H&P. The larger the home bias in the preferences for capital goods, the less they diversify.
￿ decreases with ￿ and is kept above 1
2 for ￿ < 1
2 and below 1
2 for ￿ > 1
2. Thus, as H&P did, I
￿nd a portfolio biased towards home assets as the optimal allocation for households to reach
perfect risk sharing. A larger trade share (smaller ￿) in capital goods implies a weaker terms
of trade response to changes in relative ￿nal demand. So, for any given diversi￿cation level,
the indirect e⁄ect of demand changes on relative consumption that works through prices is
going to be smaller. Moreover, whilst ￿ ￿ 1
2, ￿ decreases with labour income share. This is
20Notice that ￿ and ￿ appear multiplied by 2. When investment at home goes up, home country in-
creases both the demand for domestic goods (by ￿) and for foreign goods (by 1 ￿ ￿) and etP￿
F;tK￿
F;t =
(1 ￿ ￿)PK;tKt,PH;tKH;t = ￿PK;tKt. Thus, ￿| includes the term (2￿ ￿ 1). By the same token, PtCt ￿
etP￿
t C￿
t = ::: ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)PK;tKt ￿ (￿￿)PK;tKt = (2￿ ￿ 1)PK;tKt.
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because when ￿ is high terms of trade does most of the job in equalizing consumptions. A
smaller diversi￿cation is needed to match perfect risk sharing.
In the extreme case of ￿ ! 1, i.e. the country uses only domestically produced goods as
capital in the creation of new ￿rms, households do not diversify at all, ￿ ! 0. This shows,
again, that the home bias on consumption preferences is not relevant for diversi￿cation, but
also that the size of the labour income share alone, without the presence of some bias in
demand (here in capital goods), is not important either. This is easy to understand: when
home agents use only their own goods to create ￿rms, the ￿rst term of the indirect e⁄ect, the
one explaining the impact of relative output on relative consumption, is zero. There is no
valuation of home output because ￿ exible prices react one to one to the excess of demand,
compensating the shock and ensuring perfect risk sharing. Thus, it agrees with Cole and
Obstfeld￿ s result. Finally, when the bundle of capital goods is equally divided between
home and foreign varieties, households need perfect pooling (i.e. they perfectly divide their
portfolios between home and foreign equities) in order to get perfect risk sharing, as in
Heathcote and Perri￿ s paper.















where ￿ is the capital income share, ! is the parameter of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator
in consumption (i.e. the indicator of the bias in consumption) and 1 ￿ ￿
HP is the level of
diversi￿cation in the portfolio (i.e. the equivalent of ￿ in this paper.)
This happens because, when the demand on capital goods is equally allocated on home
and foreign goods, any increase of either home or foreign investment pushes the demand for
domestic and foreign varieties in the same proportion, keeping terms of trade invariable (the
indirect e⁄ect is zero). So, if agents rely on perfect pooling, they share the weight of the
￿nancing whichever country is a⁄ected by the shock.
The model provides an example of complementarity between terms of trade movements
and income transfers via asset holdings in insuring against consumption risk from produc-
tivity ￿ uctuations.
Relative price movements already provide some consumption risk insurance, but this is
not perfect. The reason lays on the fact that trade ￿ ows among countries move terms of
trade in response, not only to consumption but also, to investment needs. These needs are
possibly driven by expectations of future returns to capital. Portfolio diversi￿cation provides
a way to insulate terms of trade from the components of demand due to investment. Hence,
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/143372.4. EQUILIBRIUM 47
income ￿ ows from assets cover the demand for local inputs by foreign ￿rms: the higher the
proportion of investment which is local, the lower the need to diversify.
2.4.7 Allocation of ￿rms
The free entry conditions (FECs) provide us with a system of two di⁄erence equations
to solve for n and n￿. At Home, the FEC is,
PK;tKt = PH;tKH;t + PF;tKF;t = EtQt;t+1￿t+1 (h):























































































































































Although an analytical solution for n and n￿ cannot be provided, it is worth noticing that
the expressions above do not depend on ￿ at all. Hence, the decision on the allocation of
plants of production is completely disconnected from the decision on the ownership of ￿rms
made by agents in the home and foreign country. So, it follows that the dynamics of markets
do not invalidate H&P result, found in a perfectly competitive world.
2.4.8 The labour demand in equilibrium.












21See appendix for the computations.
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I use the technology restriction to get the lagrangian multiplier, ￿t = pt (h) ￿￿1











Households supply an elastic amount of labour. It increases with the increment of the returns
to scale of their e⁄ort, i.e. the higher ￿ is, the more productive labour is and the more they
are willing to work. Labour supply goes up for higher levels of AH;t -the productivity of
technology- and for higher prices, since, in this case, they need more income to be able to
consume the same amount of goods. Finally, they supply less labour when wages are high,
given prices.
2.5 Nominal rigidities
This subsection checks whether the main result of the model holds under the assumption
that prices are sticky. Suppose the simplest case of nominal rigidities: ￿rms must set their
prices one period in advance, at the moment they are created, whilst the optimal level of
labour is chosen when the production starts.
2.5.1 The Optimal Monetary Policy to Replicate Flexible Prices Allocation
To start with the analysis of an economy with price stickiness, let￿ s assume that the
monetary authority decides to commit to a simple monetary policy. It determines a monetary
stance tied to productivity shocks in such a way it is able to optimally obtain the equilibrium
allocation we found when prices were perfectly ￿ exible. Under this restrictive assumption,
the optimal portfolio derived in the ￿rst part of the chapter holds.
2.5.1.1 Production with Producer Currency Pricing -PCP-
The Firm￿ s Problem At time t, the ￿rm maximizes the discounted value of future pro￿ts
subject to the technology restriction. Let￿ s assume that they set prices in the currency of the
country of production. They are paid pt (h) for any unit sold at home or abroad, although
foreign households account for the exchange rate, et, in deciding the level of consumption
of variety h (p￿
t (h) = 1
etpt (h), so c￿































Hence, one can simply maximize,
max
pt+1(h)
EtQt;t+1 [pt+1(h)Yt+1(h) ￿ wt+1‘t+1 (h)]; (2.36)
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where ￿t+1 = Pt+1Ct+1. Prices crucially depend on expected ￿. An expected monetary
expansion raises the price level and nominal spending.
Since, in equilibrium PH;t = n
1
1￿￿
























Let￿ s assume a monetary stance ￿t = A
1
￿
H;t. Thus, the government reacts one to one to any
productivity shock a⁄ecting the domestic economy. In this case, the preset price is a constant







The government controls the path of short-term rates i, providing a nominal anchor for mar-
ket expectations. A forward-looking measure of monetary stance, ￿ is provided by equation
(2.11) and the de￿nition ￿t+1 = Pt+1Ct+1.
At time t+1, the ￿rm created at t chooses ‘t+1 (h) by minimizing costs. The f.o.c. does







In order to compute ￿, I use the expressions of pro￿ts and labour income as a proportion
of domestic output, as well as the de￿nitions in (2.27). All of them are in aggregate terms.
Since the individual price is not used, but only the price indexes and I have assumed that
￿rms are atomistic, the optimal ￿ is not a⁄ected by the nominal rigidities in the economy,
when prices are set in the currency of the producer. For example, from




22Go to the appendix for details.
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The same expression from the fully-￿ exible price version applies, as happens with that of
pro￿ts.23
2.5.1.2 Production with Local Currency Pricing -LCP-
In this subsection, I show how fundamental equations change when prices are set on the
local currency (i.e. on the currency of the market where the variety is consumed). However,





























When prices are set per market, ￿rms must su⁄er from the uncertainty generated by the




















































Notice that the price of variety h at home depends also on the part of the production
e⁄ectively used in the home country (Lt+1CH;t+1 + nt+2KH;t+1); and the price of the same





H;t+1),24 both for consumption and investment.
23However, this is true under the most simple example of price stickiness. If I introduce costs of adjustment,
the parameter of the quadratic form may appear in a new expression of ￿.



























H;t as it was in
our model.
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where Vt = ct (h) + nt+1kt (h), Dt = ct (h) + nt+1kt (h) and, symmetrically, V ￿
t = ct (f) +
nt+1kt (f), D￿
t = c￿
t (f) + n￿
t+1k￿
t (f). Moreover,
wt‘t (h) = ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿


















4 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿) 4 |







t. Let￿ s de￿ne 4￿ = ￿t ￿ et￿￿
t.
Thus, the new equation for output absorption in the economy is,
4￿ = (2￿ ￿ 1) 4 C + (2￿ ￿ 1) 4 |:
Notice that 4￿ = 4U and, so, 4C is equal to that in the previous cases. Hence, the
expression of ￿ is still true.
2.5.2 The General Monetary Policy (with Giancarlo Corsetti)
In this section, we allow authorities to introduce a general monetary policy. If we keep
the previous setup mainly unchanged and we only introduce one-period preset prices, the
optimal portfolio is not constant anymore. Instead, it is linked to the present discounted
values of nominal labour income and nominal output.
The presence of nominal rigidities in prices, causes a negative correlation between labour
income and dividends. After a positive shock on labour productivity, prices do not adjust.
Hence, demand remains untouched and ￿rms release some labour force because they are able
to produce the same within less hours of work.
However, nominal rigidities do not prevent households from getting perfect risk sharing
in equilibrium. We just need to create a new asset per country, a part from ￿rm shares.
Let￿ s introduce two new assets X, one denominated in Home currency, the other in
Foreign currency. The number of assets exchanged across the border are XH and XF and
their prices, qH and qF.
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Let￿ s de￿ne these assets as generic one-period forward contracts (i.e. there is no exchange
of cash at the time when the contract is entered.) The Euler equation must satisfy:




where ￿X is the payo⁄ of the contract.
Using the budget constraint under our educated conjecture of e¢ cient risk sharing with
constant shares ￿ and X we get:





















X;t ￿ qX;tXH + Eq
￿































X + qX;tXH ￿ Eq
￿




If we take di⁄erences under the maintained hypothesis of perfect risk sharing and use the
equilibrium condition for forward contracts:











































t ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿1)￿PKI;
which yields:






























t] ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿PI:
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From the resource constraint, we know that under perfect risk sharing:
0 = PHYH ￿ EP
￿
FYF ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)￿PI: (2.45)


































Given that the cash ￿ ow of the forward contract is endogenous, we can set arbitrarily the
Xs equal to 1. We then have 3 unknowns ￿; ￿t and ￿￿



















































But, by symmetry, one of the two last equations is redundant.25
2.5.2.1 General solution































Note above that the size of X only enters multiplicatively to the cash ￿ ow, which con￿rms
that it is irrelevant.
25To ￿nd the ￿ exible-price solution presented in the previous section from the ￿rst two equations above,
see the appendix.
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PDV (PY ) ￿ PDV (W‘):
Hence,

















The equilibrium share holding of home assets is:26
1 ￿ ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿) + (2￿ ￿ 1)
PDV (W‘)
PDV (PY )




This share is not constant. It depends on the present discounted value of labour income
relative to the present discounted value of output. The case of ￿ exible prices, instead,
implies that the share of labour income in total income is constant. Thus,
1 ￿ ￿ =





















￿￿ ￿ 2￿ + 1
￿ ￿ 2￿ + 1
: (2.54)


















￿￿ ￿ 2￿ + 1













26Observe that, without home bias ￿ = 1=2, the solution is again perfect pooling, i.e. ￿ = 1=2 always.
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2.5.2.2 Interpreting the solution
Equity shares With nominal rigidities, ￿ depends crucially on the properties of the shock
and on monetary policy:
1 ￿ ￿ =















If monetary policy targets the ￿ ex-price equilibrium ￿ = AH,27 we have:
1 ￿ ￿ =



















(1 ￿ ￿) + (2￿ ￿ 1)
2(1 ￿ ￿) + (2￿ ￿ 1)
: (2.56)















1 ￿ ￿ =

























Other things equal, with home bias in investment ￿ > 1=2 the share (1 ￿ ￿) is increasing in
























(2￿ ￿ 1) 1
B [1 ￿ ￿]
(:)
2 > 0 if ￿ > 1=2:
and decreasing otherwise.
27Which is the same policy I assumed in the previous subsection, for the case of ￿ = 1:
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Let￿ s suppose now that ￿ is held constant. For instance, arbitrarily set ￿ = 1:
1 ￿ ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿) + (2￿ ￿ 1) E‘
EYH
2(1 ￿ ￿) + (2￿ ￿ 1) E‘
EYH
=























With a constant monetary stance, the covariance between productivity shocks and em-
ployment is negative. Hence, provided ￿ > 1=2, the share of domestic portfolio invested in
domestic equities is increasing in the absolute value of this covariance.28


























With nominal rigidities, unless monetary policy stabilizes the economy at the ￿ ex-price
equilibrium, a positive productivity shock raises markups above the ￿ ex-price level and
lowers labour income. The last term of the cash ￿ ow above implies that, by entering a
forward, foreign investors ￿ pay back￿the excess pro￿ts in proportion of the share they own
of the domestic capital (and domestic investors receive it.) Labour income share goes down,
hence the cash ￿ ow is high:
28Another way of looking at it:
In the expression,
1 ￿ ￿ =





















ZHPH is just marginal costs over prices. Hence it is the inverse of the markup. The term PHYH
￿t =
PHYH
PtCt is total value of output over total value of consumption, hence it is equal to 1 plus the ratio of the
value of investment goods produced in the economy (also for export) to total value of consumption.

















































































I developed a stylized two-period two-country model with perfect risk sharing. The
dynamic number of ￿rms and the international portfolio diversi￿cation is endogenously de-
termined. The model builds on Heathcote and Perri￿ s idea of the compatibility of the home
bias in portfolio found in actual data and perfect risk sharing.
The model presented here con￿rms Heathcote and Perri￿ s result in the sense that an
equilibrium exists where a home-biased and constant portfolio allocation is able to provide
households with perfect risk sharing. It shows that terms of trade play an important role
in neutralizing the e⁄ects of country-speci￿c shocks on relative consumption, as Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) claimed. However, they are not able to o⁄set the disturbances on investment.
One needs to diversify assets to control for these.
The main contributions of this analysis are the following: ￿rst, it highlights the need to
distinguish between the preferences of demand on capital and those on consumption goods.
Contrary to H&P￿ s result, it is the home-bias parameter in the Cobb-Douglas aggregator for
capital demand that determines the level of diversi￿cation. Second, I checked the role of the
endogenous number of ￿rms or varieties in the determination of the portfolio allocation. I
￿nd that these two endogenous variables are completely independent when the economy has
￿ exible determination of prices, i.e. in the long run horizon. Finally, it is shown that, when
the monetary authority imposes a monetary policy to replicate the ￿ exible price allocation
in equilibrium, the result for the optimal portfolio is still true, whatever the price regime
applied to the economy. When a more general monetary policy is allowed, we are still able
to provide perfect risk sharing under our incomplete-markets scenario.29 However, in this
case, we need to add a generic forward contract which pay-o⁄must allow foreign investors to
29We do not need a complete arrow-debreu security set to get perfect risk sharing.
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"pay back" the excess pro￿ts generated by the negative correlation between dividends and
labour income. This section is a work-in-progress with Giancarlo Corsetti.
This chapter o⁄ers a powerful framework to explore di⁄erent dimensions of the world
economy. With it, one is able to study the disturbances generated by shocks both on the
productivity of production (AH, AF) and on the productivity of creation (K, K￿) and analyse
the role of the monetary policy in their stabilization. One can consider the di⁄erences
between PCP and LCP and observe the transmission of shocks in an environment with
market dynamics. Finally, one can take into account and compare both the set-up with
perfect risk sharing and the ￿nancial autarky version. The simulations of these alternative
economies may provide extremely interesting results to go one step further in international
macroeconomics research.
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This set-up implies that, for given home-currency prices of the varieties, pt (h) and pt (f),























2.7.2 The ￿rms￿problem in the foreign country under fully ￿ exible prices:
Creation
































Foreign ￿rms choose the demand of each capital good, k￿
t (h) and k￿
t (f), by solving the







































Once operative, ￿rms maximize pro￿ts:
max
pt(h)
pt(h)Yt(h) ￿ wt‘t (h); (2.72)


















Ltct (h) + nt+1kt (h) + etL￿
tc￿
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Home ￿rms choose the optimal price:





















































































Symmetrically, in the foreign country:
As at home, ￿rms produce a di⁄erentiated variety with an homogeneous technology





The state of the economy is
fAH;t;AF;tg:












































In order to ensure stability, the ￿rst derivative of output with respect to the number of ￿rms














This is always true, since the labour income share, ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿￿1




￿ | {z }
>0
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿






1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ < 0



















and ￿ and ￿ are both positive. The stability condition ensures the inexistence of increasing
returns to scale in investment, which would make the model explosive..
2.7.4 Pro￿ts Aggregation
Firm￿ s pro￿ts are
￿t (h) = pt (h)yt (h) ￿ wt‘t (h):
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The price index and the aggregate output equations are needed in order to aggregate pro￿ts










The latter is due to the fact that the bundles of capital and consumption goods are structured
equally and have the same elasticity of substitution and, consequently, ￿rm charges the same








































where nt has cancelled out.
2.7.5 Allocation of ￿rms
The free entry conditions (FECs) provide us with a system of two di⁄erence equations
to solve for n and n￿. At Home, the FEC is,
PK;tKt = EtQt;t+1￿t+1 (h)
or
PH;tKH;t + PF;tKF;t = EtQt;t+1￿t+1 (h)
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H;t+1 .30 Cancel PC in
Pt+1Ct+1
PH;t+1 . Get a common factor ￿￿￿1
￿￿ Multiply by nt+1. And,













































































































































































2.7.6 Derivation of the Terms of Trade






















































































30Remember that pt (h) = etp￿
t (h), PH;t = n
1
1￿￿
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One can also derive TOT from the resource constraints. For symmetric countries and
population equal to 1,
CH;t + C
￿










































































































EtQt;t+1 [pt+1(h)Yt+1(h) ￿ wt+1‘t+1 (h)];




























































Substituting the de￿nition of the discount factor, the expression for wages and keeping in









































where ￿t+1 = Pt+1Ct+1. Prices crucially depend on expected ￿. An expected monetary
expansion raises the price level and nominal spending.
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The same expression from the fully-￿ exible price version applies, as happens with that of
pro￿ts.
2.7.7.2 LCP
New expressions for equations (2.24) and (2.25) in the text:






































where Vt = Ltct (h) + nt+1kt (h), Dt = L￿
tc￿
t (h) + n￿
t+1k￿
t (h) and, symmetrically, V ￿
t =
Ltct (f) + nt+1kt (f), D￿
t = L￿
tc￿
t (f) + n￿
t+1k￿
t (f). Moreover,
wt‘t (h) = ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿

























































IH;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I
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4￿ = (2￿ ￿ 1) 4 C + (2￿ ￿ 1) 4 |:
Notice that 4￿ = 4U and, so, 4C is equal to the previous cases. Hence, the expression of
￿ is still true.
2.7.8 Nominal Rigidities with a General Monetary Policy
2.7.8.1 Checking the ￿ exible-price solution
If we set ￿t = 0 and
￿
ZHPH = ￿￿1
￿ , it is easy to see that the above equations become




























1 ￿ ￿ =
1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿￿








￿ With no home bias, for ￿ = 1=2; ￿ = 1=2. This is the perfect pooling solution.
￿ When goods become more and more substitute, lim￿￿>1 (1 ￿ ￿) = ￿. The share
coincides with Home bias.
￿ In general, the share of portfolio allocated on home assets, (1 ￿ ￿), is increasing in ￿
and decreasing in ￿:
@ (1 ￿ ￿)
@￿
=
(￿ ￿ 2)(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿) + 2(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿￿)
(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿)
2 =
=
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿)
2 > 0:
@ (1 ￿ ￿)
@￿
=
￿ (1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿￿) ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿)
(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿)
2 =
=
(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ + ￿￿ + 1 ￿ 2￿)
(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿)
2 < 0:
31Imposing ￿ = 1 for simplicity in this section.
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GAINS FROM FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE
OPENNESS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
International ￿nancial integration is believed to have two major potential bene￿ts: it
enhances an e¢ cient allocation of capital and helps countries sharing risk by reducing con-
sumption and income volatilities. So far, however, neither empirical nor theoretical studies
are able to clearly demonstrate to what extent these claims are true. This paper uses the
New Open Economics Macroeconomy (NOEM) model developed in chapter II to shed some
light on the theoretical side of this literature. It addresses the open debate on the interrela-
tion between di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial integration and trade openness with international
volatilities.
The second chapter of this dissertation o⁄ered a stylized set-up to analyse international
transmission. In Chapter three I exploit this set-up to develop a quantitative analysis with
the tools provided by this framework. I experiment with the economy assuming two di⁄erent
￿nancial structures. The ￿rst one presents a set-up of incomplete ￿nancial markets. Indi-
viduals do not have access to a complete set of arrow-debreu contingent-claims, but only to
shares of home and foreign ￿rms, as well as to an international riskless bond. However, as
it has been proved in the previous chapter, these are su¢ cient to provide with perfect-risk-
sharing. This scenario is called RS (risk sharing) or FI (fully integrated) in the text. The
second one is a ￿nancial isolated economy. Home and Foreign countries can freely trade on
goods, but individuals are not able to invest abroad.
These two environments show the e⁄ects of international integration of capital markets
and trade openness on macroeconomic volatilities. On the one side, as a large part of
empirical analysis shows, the model reports an increase of the volatilities of the real exchange
rate and the terms of trade as the country opens its capital market. On the other side,
consumption volatility is a⁄ected di⁄erently by the ￿nancial integration process depending
on the source of the real shock.
Concerning the links between trade openness and volatilities, neither the causality direc-
tion nor its strength is clear. Empirical studies, often claim that this relationship is extremely
73
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weak. At a theoretical level, real exchange rate (RER) uncertainty may discourage inter-
national trade but, simultaneously, inter-country trade favours international transmission of
shocks via RER and terms of trade (TOT), a⁄ecting their volatilities. Herwartz and We-
ber (2007) argue that the link is quite heterogeneous among countries and that it might be
non-linear.
Traditional literature claims the existence of a direct and indirect e⁄ect of trade openness
over output growth: on the one hand, openness generates a direct positive e⁄ect on output
growth; on the other, however, it enhances aggregate production volatility, which causes a
reduction of output growth. For this triangular relation to be possible, either the direct
e⁄ect must outweigh the indirect one or the relation between openness to trade and output
volatility has been incorrectly observed. This paper sustains the ￿rst explanation, since it
￿nds that, in general, international trade increases output and consumption volatilities under
any level of ￿nancial integration.
The analysis is carried out in a set-up with market dynamics. The introduction of the
extensive margin allows for a distinction to be made between di⁄erent types of productivity
disturbances. One can shock either the productivity of manufacturing or that of the tech-
nology of creation of new varieties.1 Indeed, the ￿rst chapter of this dissertation studies the
opposite e⁄ects generated by these two shocks on the allocation of ￿rms. I do it in a simple
closed-economy model with ￿rms￿entry. The presence of endogenous entry can alter the dy-
namic response to shocks, leading to greater persistence in the e⁄ects of monetary and real
shocks.2 Entry may have notable welfare e⁄ects, to the degree that households derive utility
from greater variety (the love of variety in consumption and investment) and because the
entry of new ￿rms raises competition in a market. Thus, it is relevant to take into account
the behaviour of the economy after these di⁄erent impacts, as well as, to observe the welfare
e⁄ects in terms of the variations in the range of varieties available in a speci￿c market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section two provides a brief literature review
to situate the paper and inform of the blueprint on the topic. Section three presents the
simplest analytical version of the model, which replicates the closed economy of chapter II.
Real shocks, on the productivity of creation and of production, are simulated with Schmitt-
GrohØ algorithm both under ￿ exible and one-period-in-advance price setting. The scope
of this section is, ￿rst of all, to get in touch with the more general model, as well as to
provide a tool to observe how trade openness alone a⁄ects volatilities. To do the latter, one
can compare the closed economy with a ￿nancially isolated country. Section four presents
1See Corsetti et al. (2004.)
2See Bergin and Corsetti (2006.)
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the quantitative results for the open economy: ￿rst under ￿nancial integrated markets and,
afterwards under the ￿nancial autarky case. Section ￿ve summarizes the results for di⁄erent
degrees of trade openness. Finally, section six concludes. An appendix with some extra
explanatory plots and the parametrization used in simulations can be found at the end.
3.2 Brief Literature Review
3.2.1 Financial Integration and Volatility
Understanding the links between globalization and the dynamics of macroeconomic
volatility has recently come to the forefront. This is, mainly, due to a burgeoning liter-
ature that describes the ￿rst-order e⁄ects volatility has on welfare and, more recently, to
the apparition of a number of papers documenting the declining volatility of output in the
US and most industrial economies since the mid-eighties. However, existent literature dis-
agrees considerably on the strength and directions of such relationships. Available empirical
evidence on the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on volatility is very far limited. Hence, at
theoretical level, the e⁄ects of increased integration on business cycle volatility are not clear
either: on the one hand, increased ￿nancial integration allows households to cushion against
adverse domestic shocks by lending and borrowing abroad. This would cause a decline in the
volatility of consumption. On the other hand, ￿nancial integration increases the potential
for the magni￿cation of domestic ￿nancial markets when foreign capital enters them. If this
happens, output and investment volatilities will increase.
Kose et al. (2003) address these questions at the empirical level and ￿nd that ￿nancial
openness, as measured by gross capital ￿ ows as a ratio to GDP, is associated with an increase
in the ratio of consumption volatility to income volatility, opposite to the theoretical risk-
sharing bene￿ts of capital globalization. However, this relationship is found to be non-
linear.3 Above a certain threshold the ratio starts to decrease again. Moreover, capital
account openness is associated with higher output volatility, although the coe¢ cient is only
marginally signi￿cant.
The model I present compares a non-integrated economy with a fully integrated one,
i.e. obviously, this full integration would be above any measured threshold. As Kose et al.
found in the data, this highly integrated economy provides households with more capacity of
consumption smoothness. The ratio of consumption to output volatility falls with the jump
from the autarkic regime to the open one. In addition, I also observe higher output volatility
in the risk sharing economy. These quantitative matches give some robustness to the model
3Evans and Hnatkovska (2006) explored an economy under three di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial integration
and also found a non-linearity on this relation.
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to be considered a suitable tool to explore industrialized economies￿responses to shocks and
their pass-through.
An older paper by Mendoza (1994) develops a stochastic dynamic business cycle model
and concludes that quantitative variations in the volatility of output and consumption are
quite small in response to the changes in the degree of ￿nancial integration. Moreover, it
seems that larger and more persistent shocks enhance output volatility for higher levels of
￿nancial integration. On the contrary, Baxter and Crucini (1995) show that consumption
volatility decreases, although output volatility increases as the level of ￿nancial integration
goes up. They argue that these di⁄erences lie on the wealth e⁄ects and their interaction
with di⁄erent capital market regimes. Di⁄erently, Bekaert et al. (2004) ￿nd that ￿nancial
liberalization tends to be associated with lower consumption volatility. Finally, Buch and
Yener (2005) provide another proof of empirical ambiguity. They show that, in spite of the
fact that G7 countries have become more open for ￿nancial capital in legal terms over the past
decades and that capital ￿ ows have increased rapidly, there has been no consistent pattern
for consumption volatility to increase or decrease. Indeed, they found that the change over
time of the ratio of volatilities often depends on the country and the period of time. This
result is completely compatible with those reported in this paper: since the link between
consumption and output volatility with ￿nancial globalization and its sign depends on the
source of the shock, the presence of di⁄erent shocks to the economy may perfectly be the
explanation of the unclear correlation.
3.2.2 Trade Integration and Volatility
The debate is equally open for the link between openness of the goods market and volatil-
ity. Although there seems to be some consensus on the fact that more open economies are
more volatile, not all the specialists agree. Part of the literature retains that the e⁄ects are
tight to the kind of shock -sector speci￿c or common- and to the patterns of trade special-
ization. If this association is true and trade openness, nowadays, consists in the increase
in interindustry specialization across countries, industry-speci￿c shocks would result in a
rise in output volatility, as Krugman (1993) set. Moreover, in the case of highly persistent
shocks, consumption volatility would increase as well. If trade increment is done via in-
traindustry because of the higher country-specialization in speci￿c parts of the production
process chain, the volatility of output could decline.4 This evidence can be interpreted as
proof of the relation between volatilities and both ￿nancial and trade integration, i.e. glob-
alization. Some theoretical research suggests that output volatility has a positive interaction
4See Razin and Rose (1994.)
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with trade openness in the developing countries while it maintains a negative link in devel-
oped economies. Prasad et al. (2003) document that recent decades data on consumption
volatility shows a decline in developed economies. Furthermore, the level of consumption
volatility in developing countries is above that of the developed ones.
One can refer to Easterly et al. (2001) and Kose et al. (2003) to ￿nd some empirical
evidence of what the present model reports on the side of trade openness. Easterly et al.
(2001) carry an exploration of the sources of macroeconomic volatility using data for a sample
of 74 countries over the period 1960-97 and conclude that an increase in the degree of trade
openness leads to an increase in the volatility of output and consumption. However, the
signi￿cance of these two measures of international globalization on macroeconomic volatility
is not very relevant. Kose et al. (2003) give some attention to trade openness too and
suggest the existence of a positive e⁄ect of international trade on volatilities due to the
higher vulnerability of more open economies to external shocks.
Indeed, recent research tends to sustain the complementarity of trade integration and
￿nancial integration on macroeconomics volatility.5
3.3 Reduced Version: the Closed Economy
This simple closed economy version becomes the key for the present research to decouple
the e⁄ects of trade openness from those of ￿nancial integration on macroeconomic volatilities,
for the home country. To do such a comparison I confront the quantitative results of this
section with the case of ￿nancial autarky developed in section four.
3.3.1 Set-up
I concentrate on a completely autarkic economy with monopolistic competition and an
endogenous number of ￿rms or varieties. Firms set prices ￿ exibly.
3.3.1.1 Households
Households maximize the following logarithmic utility on consumption and leisure with




t (lnCt + ￿ln(N ￿ ‘t (j)));
subject to the budget constraint
Ct = wt‘t (j) + rtKt￿1nt ￿ Ktnt+1;
5See IMF, 2002.
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where ￿ is the discount factor, Kt is the exogenous requirement for the creation of a new
￿rm for next period. It is a basket of investment on all the ￿nal goods produced that period.
Ct is the basket of consumption of the produced varieties, N is the total endowment of time
per period, ‘t (j) is household￿ s elastic labour supply, ￿ is the disutility of labour, rtKt￿1nt
is the total amount of dividends the household receives today as payment of her last-year
investment. r measures the returns to capital, which depend on the pro￿ts generated by



















where ￿ > 1 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods. Notice that, for
simplicity, CES aggregators are identical, so that I can write:










Moreover, rt is the payment made by ￿rms to investors for the capital lent in the creation.
It is equivalent to the dividends. The price index has been normalized to 1. Thus, all the
prices are in terms of ￿nal goods of consumption.
A justi￿cation regarding the functional form of the utility is in order. Per-capita con-
sumption enters the instantaneous utility function log-linearly because, in the presence of
separability between consumption and labour and of a Cobb-Douglas production function
(the aggregator is a CES), it is the only formulation consistent with stationary labour supply
in a growing economy. Moreover, the disutility of labour is modelled as nonlinear to allow
us to derive an analytical expression for the labour supply function.
3.3.1.2 Firms
Final-Goods Firms do not use labour or capital. They only aggregate goods to con-








, which is used both
for consumption and capital for creation of next-period ￿rms. They maximize pro￿ts in a












pt (h)yt (h)dh = 0;
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where pt (h) is the monopolistic price that the intermediate-good ￿rms h set for its variety.
The f.o.c. is
yt (h) = pt (h)
￿￿ Yt:




t yt (h): (3.2)
Hence,




This tells us that the price per variety expressed in units of consumption increases when the
number of ￿rms does. For a given labour supply, if n increases, the amount of labour per ￿rm
must decrease. By the decreasing returns to scale, this labour is more productive, so that the
real wage, which enters the marginal cost, is higher, pushing the prices up. Schematically,













At .6 However, the price index will decrease:
# Pt =## n
1
1￿￿
t " pt (h):
Intermediate-good ￿rms produce di⁄erentiated varieties and maximize pro￿ts choos-
ing the amount of labour, ‘t (h):
￿I;t = pt (h)yt (h) ￿ wt‘t (h) ￿ rt = 0; (3.4)
subject to the technology constraint:
yt (h) = At‘t (h)
￿ : (3.5)
















@‘t(h), the derivation yields:








Finally, labour market clearing condition, assuming that the total population is 1, is
‘t (j) = ‘t (h)nt; (3.7)
6See impulse responses to check the magnitudes of w, A and y movements.
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/143373.3. REDUCED VERSION: THE CLOSED ECONOMY 80
and both productivity shock follow AR1 processes:
At = ￿tAt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)A0 + ￿t; (3.8)




K0 + ￿k;t; (3.9)
where ￿t is iid.
3.3.2 Impulse responses
3.3.2.1 Shock on Technology of Production, AH
By modelling the above set-up and shocking the economy with a 1% increase of At, one































































Notation 3.1 : in the plots, Y is aggregate output; Y H, output per ￿rm; PH is the price
per variety and the CPI, P, is normalized to one. LH is labour demand and LJ labour
supply, R is the interest rate (R = 1+i) and it is the inverse of the Q of the open economy.
A variation of 1 means a deviation of 1% from the steady state value.
In the ￿rst period, when the shock occurs, the production per ￿rm increases. The ex-
tensive margin cannot react because ￿rms need one period to build-up. Since total output is
higher in t=1 and productivity is expected to be still above its steady state value, households
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save more in order to create more varieties. Because of the higher output, the household￿ s
e⁄ort for renouncing to part of the consumption in favour of n is relatively lower. Hence,
they want to create even more ￿rms in the third and fourth period. Moreover, while n
increases, the CPI decreases,7 making the nominal cost of creation P ￿ K relatively low.




























































These are the impulse responses of a negative shock on K, i.e. a decrease (improvement)
in the amount of capital needed in the creation of a new variety or ￿rm. Most of the e⁄ects
are re￿ ected in the economy from time t+1 onwards. That is due to the one-period time-to-
build needed by ￿rms. The number of ￿rms goes up because of the relatively high e¢ ciency
of creation. Consequently, every ￿rm produces less (y (h) goes down) and the total product
increases. The latter occurs because ￿ < 1, so that, technology experiences decreasing returns
to scale on the labour input. For the same reason, ￿rms demand less labour (‘(h) decreases)
to be able to reduce their production. Since the marginal product of labour has increased,
wages go up, as prices do. Households must sacri￿ce less in order to create an extra ￿rm and,
simultaneously, their purchasing power improves (w goes up and P would decrease thanks
to the upward in n.) Hence, consumption is higher.
7The CPI, P can not be plotted since it has been normalized to 1. The reasoning here is developed
following the theoretical set-up explained above.
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3.4 The Open Economy: Two Financial Regimes
This section explores the open economy I presented in Chapter two from the point of
view of the international transmission. For this reason, I do not o⁄er a detailed presentation
of the set-up and the equilibrium solution. These can be consulted in Chapter II. Here, I
modify slightly the utility function to introduce logarithmic disutility of labour.
I start by repeating the experiments carried out for the closed economy, i.e. a study of
the impact of shocks in the country-speci￿c productivity of production and of technology is
carried on. I concentrate on the ￿ exible-price regime with full integration ￿rst; afterwards,
the case of ￿nancial autarky is developed.
3.4.1 General Set-up
Households maximize the following logarithmic utility on consumption and leisure with




t (lnCt + ￿ln(Nt ￿ ‘t (j)));
where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor and U (:) is a utility function de￿ned over the
consumption of a basket Ct and a logarithmic disutility of the labour e⁄ort, ￿. N is the
total endowment of time a household can allocate between leisure and work per period and
‘t (j) is the household￿ s elastic labour supply. The consumption basket is given by a Cobb-
Douglas aggregator over the bundles of tradables produced in the home (CH) and foreign






where ￿ < 1. CH and CF are CES aggregators over the n(n￿) varieties produced in the




















Here, h and f denote a speci￿c variety of the corresponding country. Households all over
the world ￿nance the creation of ￿rms in both countries. In order to construct her portfolio
of investment, home household purchases a fraction ￿F;t+1, of the shares issued by foreign-
country ￿rms and ￿H;t+1 of the domestic ￿rms, which will start producing next period.
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She a⁄ords her consumption expenditure and investment with the dividends received from
currently active ￿rms at home and abroad, proportionally to her current portfolio allocation:
￿H;t, ￿F;t and her labour income. The budget constraint is
Bt+1 + ￿H;t+1
nt+1 Z








pt (h)ct (h)dh +
Z n￿
t








t(f)df + wt‘t (j) + (1 + it)Bt:
￿t(h) are the pro￿ts of ￿rm h. An initial investment is needed for a new ￿rm to start
producing. qt (h) (q￿
t (f)) is the cost necessary for the creation of a ￿rm in the home (foreign)
country. ￿t(h) (￿￿
t(f)) are the pro￿ts of a single home (foreign) ￿rm in home (foreign)
currency, i.e. the total amount of dividends the household receives today as payment of her
last-year investment; et is the nominal exchange rate (pt (h) = etp￿
t (h)); ct (h), the domestic
demand for good h; nt is the number of ￿rms allocated at home and wt is the wage. Bt is the
international riskless bond. Finally, ￿ indicates the home-bias on consumption preferences.
The super script *, x￿, stands for the foreign country.
The households￿problem yields the ￿rst order conditions I have already presented and






Nt ￿ ‘t (j)
; (3.14)
I do not specify the ￿rms problem either, since it is exactly that explained in Chapter II.
3.4.2 Full Financial Integration
Let￿ s analyse the international transmission in an economy with market dynamics. To do
so, the model is treated with Schmitt-GrohŁ algorithm. The price indexes, P and P ￿, have
been taken as numeraires. Hence, all the variables are expressed in terms of ￿nal goods of
consumption. I report, below, the plots produced for the scenario with ￿nancial integration,
assuming a home bias in consumption of 0.65, whereas the demand for capital lays a 75% on
home goods. The latter parameterization, as argued in Chapter II, has been chosen to match
real data for home bias in portfolio. Indeed, 0.75-0.70 implies an equity bias towards home
goods of 0.67-0.63, a range in which the average EU-15 level of home bias in portfolio laid in
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2003.8 The actual share of imports of equipment goods over total acquisitions of equipment
varies considerably for developed countries, but almost all of them show home bias9.
The quantitative experiment has been repeated for shocks on the productivity of pro-
duction, AH and AF, and of creation, K and K￿, as well as for several levels of home bias
in both capital and consumption. When relevant, the di⁄erences in the impacts caused by
these di⁄erent levels of bias are explained, although the graphs are not included in the text
for space reasons.
Notation 3.2 Notation in the plots works as follows: LH is ‘(h) in the text, LF is ‘(f),
LJ is ‘(j) and N is n. A subscript s is sometimes added to indicate foreign variables, RER
is the real exchange rate and TOT, the terms of trade. In the ￿gures reporting savings and
investment dynamics, h stands for home and f for foreign, ￿nally, I is investment and S,
savings. The rest of the variables keep the names used in the analytical analysis.
3.4.2.1 Shocks on the productivity of production, AH
When the Home country is impacted by an improvement on its technology of production,
every produced unit of variety h becomes cheaper. Firms are able to produce as much with
lower levels of labour. Hence, ‘(h) decreases and every single household takes some holidays
(i.e. ‘(j) decreases simultaneously, in the ￿rst period) due to the wealth e⁄ect. Notice,
however, that ‘(h) experiences an immediate negative jump, followed by further decrease
in the subsequent periods. Although ￿rms need less labour to produce at the same level,
households desire to take advantage of the shock to enlarge the number of available varieties
in the market. Thus, the number of ￿rms goes up altogether with ‘(j), from the second
period. As intuition tells us, the economy adjustment works mostly via the intensive margin
(more production per ￿rm), but the set-up of new ￿rms is also cheaper, since the same
goods are used for both consumption and investment, and that is the reason for having
some adjustment via extensive margin too. Indeed, consumption increases (even more in the
second period, when part of the extensive margin adjustment has already been done) but it
does not absorb the total variation of aggregate output (YH). Finally, the home price index
goes strictly down due to two e⁄ects: ￿rst, the decrease of the price per variety p(h) and,
second, the increase in n.
8I decided to be consistent with the previous chapter in choosing the values of the parameters here.
Equity home bias for EU-15 in 2003 was around 65%. However, I do not mention the transition of ￿, the
level of portfolio diversi￿cation since it has been proved that a constant value is optimal regardless of the
shocks impacting the economy and the passage of time. There are no transition movements in it.
9See Eaton and Kortum (2001) and the explanation in the introduction of Chapter II. Denmark is an
exception to this empirical fact.
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Let￿ s focus, now, on the foreign country. Terms of trade worsen for home, making imports
cheaper for the neighbours. However, due to the home bias in consumption and capital, the
foreign country experiences a lower upwards in consumption during the transition back to
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the steady state. Demand for goods f is higher and expected to be over the steady state
value for some time. To create more varieties in this country would not be a good strategy,
since most of the goods used in the building-up are produced there (due to the presence
of home bias), at the higher price the extra demand has generated and with a relatively
low productivity. In fact, n￿ goes downward. For this reason, the foreign aggregate output
decreases in spite of the fact that every ￿rm contracts more labour (‘(f) is higher) and
that, consequently, per ￿rm product is higher. To put it in di⁄erent words, initially, the
expenditure switching e⁄ect is high and turns demand towards home cheaper goods. This
forces foreign ￿rms to reduce their outputs and, consequently, the amount of contracted
labour. Foreign households enjoy more leisure in this period. Later, the recovering starts.
The number of ￿rms at home can be adjusted. Foreign pro￿ts are above the equilibrium from
the moment the extensive margin adapts (n￿ reduces) to the new situation and the increase
in wages encourages foreign households to choose this higher leisure (‘￿ (j) decreases). Notice
that the shock on the productivity generates more volatility on home extensive margin than
in the foreign one. This is the cause of the di⁄erences on wage transitions. In the moment of
the impact and during the ￿rst period, the increase in PF is compensated by the drop in PH.
Terms of trade worsen for home. In the second period, the increase of n and decrease of n￿
generate a new decrease in PH and the increase in PF, which explains the extra deterioration
of the terms of trade. All this permits the non-shocked (foreign) economy to bene￿t from
the technology improvement too. It is able to consume more and to perceive higher wages,
which enhance the demand for foreign goods.
The intertemporal adjustment identi￿ed in most of the variables, i.e. the fact that ‘(j),
p(h)... change the sign of the distance from the steady state between ￿rst periods and
the subsequent ones, and that some of them like ‘(h), YH,... experience an initial jump,
followed by a further downward/upward movement in the same direction, can be interpreted
as a consequence of the adjustment cost of investment. Indeed, in the ￿rst period, in which
the number of ￿rms is already set, any shock bumps in an economy where the costs of
adapting the level of investment are in￿nite. Although here, the rigidity comes from n
instead of capital itself. Afterwards, it can start walking again towards the equilibrium. In
a typical economy with costs of capital adjustment, it would not su⁄er a bang after one
period, as n does, but it would smoothly move up. Moreover, it would not reach such a high
maximum(minimum) level due to the fact that the remission of the e⁄ects of the positive
(negative) shock would make such a large reaction worthless.
Finally, the real exchange rate depreciates. This is explained by the kick the consumption
price indexes receive from variations of n. The depreciation of the real exchange rate (RER)
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generates the distance one sees between the two interest rates (Qt = 1
1+it and Q￿ = 1
1+i￿
t ),
generally called uncovered interest parity.
When ￿ is high enough, the home price index for capital responds downwards to a







￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ :
Intuitively, entrepreneurs are able to buy most of the inputs necessary for the setup of a
new variety at a lower price (because the composite K contains basically home goods). This
explains that n reacts even more positively for high levels of ￿.
In the case both countries have identical preferences on consumption and capital goods,
i.e. ￿ = ￿ = 0:5, the foreign country would enjoy an increase in real terms of consumption
equal to that experienced at home. All the insurance goes via terms of trade, since PH and PF
vary exactly equal but in opposite directions. Any improvement in a country is transmitted
to the other via relative prices movements, keeping exchange rates (real and nominal) and the
aggregate price indexes (for consumption, P and P ￿, and for capital, PK and P ￿
K) untouched.
Once more, the number of ￿rms in the foreign country decreases, whereas production per
￿rm is higher. In contrast to the case with home biases, foreign pro￿ts go down. Compared
to the economy with home biases, in the ￿ = ￿ = 0:5, every foreign ￿rm contract in more
workers and wages are more expensive due to the further increase in consumption.
The last group of plots in Figure 4 report the dynamics of savings (S = PHYH ￿PC and
S￿ = PFYF ￿ P ￿C￿) and investment (I = nt+1PKK and I￿ = n￿
t+1P ￿
KK￿) in both countries,
as well as the part of investment ￿nanced by the other country (S ￿ I and S￿ ￿ I￿.)10
Foreign savings describe an upward hooked form caused by foreign output response to the
shock, whereas investment decreases immediately due to the higher price index of capital
goods and the consequent reduction of the number of ￿rms. These two movements favour an
improvement of S￿ ￿I￿ abroad. At home, total investment goes up despite of the reduction
in the price index. Do not forget to keep in mind that the share of investment ￿nanced by
the foreign country is always constant, regardless of the shock, i.e. the international portfolio
is at its optimum, maintaining a time-invariant proportion of diversi￿cation, as it has been
analytically proved in Chapter II.
10A textbook de￿nition of the current account balance says it is the change in the value of its net claims on
the rest of the world -the change in its net foreign assets- over a period. The plots do not show this change but,
after setting the international bond to zero, shares on n + n￿ are the set of available claims in the economy.
The home net possession of foreign claims is measured by the di⁄erence between (S ￿I)￿(S￿ ￿I￿), i.e. the
part of investment not covered by home savings, which is ￿nanced by the foreign country minus the part of
investment made abroad and not ￿nanced by foreign savings during the period.
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3.4.2.2 Shocks on the productivity of creations, K
Opposite to a positive shock on the productivity of production, an unanticipated im-
provement of the technology of creation in the home country, i.e. a decrease of K, has a
positive e⁄ect on the number of ￿rms at home. This is consistent to the ￿ndings in the
Chapter I of this dissertation and the small experiment carried out in section two. Since
the creation of varieties is relatively cheap in the home country, entrepreneurs can take ad-
vantage of their e¢ ciency and enlarge the range of products in the market. For the same
reason, only few foreign entrepreneurs decide to enter the market, indeed, n￿ decreases.
An interesting feature of the e⁄ects of a shock in this economy, either on A or on K, is
the intertemporal reaction of labour supply. ‘(j) is below its steady state value in the ￿rst
period but goes up afterwards. This is surprising at ￿rst sight, since one expects consumption
and labour to be positively correlated. Indeed, they are from the second period onwards, but
at the moment of the shock the wealth e⁄ect wins. With the positive shock,11 the number of
￿rms dramatically increases after the ￿rst period in which it is ￿xed. Hence, working today or
tomorrow is really di⁄erent for households: today, the labour e⁄ort is spread among a smaller
range of varieties. The total labour is more productive when it is allocated in more ￿rms,
due to the decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, there is a wealth e⁄ect via wages: they
increase humbly when the shock occurs but steep upwards in the following periods. Labour
supply accompanies this increase and households o⁄er more labour during the transition.
However, while the rigidity in n prevents the economy to adjust perfectly, they enjoy more
leisure and wait.
The extensive margin su⁄ers in favour of the intensive one: investment is cheap, so
households do not need to save so much (I decreases.) Initially, the wealth e⁄ect pushes
labour supply down, increasing the cost of work for ￿rms, which have less incentives to
contract (‘(h) goes down) and decrease their outputs. In aggregate, the impact in the
intensive margin is stronger than that of the extensive, thus total output is lower after the
shock. Prices are above the steady state value due to the expensiveness of labour, but the
price index is below because, on it, the impact from the increment of n is higher than the
one coming from the upwards prices.
11￿ Positive￿in the sense it is bene￿cial for the Home country. It is an improvement in technology. although,
mathematically, it is a negative shock on K, since K decreases by 1%.
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Since creation is less costly, more ￿rms enter the market. That pushes pro￿ts down at
home: ￿rms are built-up until expected pro￿ts do not cover the set-up cost. In the foreign
country, pro￿ts vary much less during the transition, compared to home pro￿ts. The small
downward movement is generated by the higher wages and the initially lower production
motivated by the expectation that less output will be allocated in capital goods -and so,
demand decreases-, because the creation of ￿rms is less e¢ cient there. The foreign country
absorbs part of the positive impact via terms of trade. Imports are cheaper now and this,
altogether with the higher revenue from dividends -although home pro￿ts per ￿rm are down,
the aggregate is higher because of the greater number of active ￿rms-, causes the improvement
of foreign consumption.
For ￿ > 0:5, i.e. home bias in consumption, a decrease of the price of the basket of home
goods, PH, makes the real exchange rate lower. Hence, home experiences a depreciation
in front of the foreign country which enhances the bene￿ts to the other country. However,
compared to the case without home biases, the main e⁄ects are qualitatively the same.
3.4.3 Financial Autarky
A large part of the experts in macroeconomics agrees on the incompleteness of the capital
markets. I do not want to disregard this reality, here. The scope of this section is to study
how the international transmission works under the simplest example of extreme incomplete
markets: the case of ￿nancial autarky. The two countries are completely isolated in terms of
capital ￿ ows, although they are able to trade in consumption and capital goods, as before.
Home (foreign) households must ￿nance the total investment necessary to build up next
period producing ￿rms in the home (foreign) country. So far, the budget constraint was
Bt+1 + ￿H;t+1
nt+1 Z








pt (h)ct (h)dh +
Z n￿
t








t(f)df + wt‘t (j) + (1 + it)Bt;
where, for the ￿nancial autarky scenario, ￿H = 1 (all ￿rms set-up at home are ￿nanced by
home agents), ￿F = 0 (home households do not invest abroad) and B, the international
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pt (f)ct (f)df =
Z nt
￿t(h)dh + wt‘t (j):
Moreover, the economy must keep a balanced trade, since it can no longer cover any tempo-





t (h)nt = ct (f)pt (f)n
￿
t: (3.17)
The nominal value of home exports have to be equal to the nominal value of home imports,
period by period.
Obviously, households have to withdraw the perfect risk sharing target. They are a⁄ected
by shocks that impact the home economy, as well as, by those of the foreign, via terms of
trade movements and the ￿nancial isolation prevent them from any kind of international
insurance. They can only vary their level of investment to smooth some consumption.
3.4.3.1 Relative Volatilities: Financial Autarky vs Risk Sharing
The main point to be emphasized in the following analysis of shocks￿ e⁄ects is the
magnitude of the volatilities relative to those found in the fully integrated case. Regardless
of the source or the direction of the shock, the economy with a high degree of ￿nancial
integration shows, unambiguously, more volatility during the transition back to the steady
state. Thus, when a country moves from a ￿nancial isolation to an integrated economy,
shocks generate larger volatilities on terms of trade and the exchange rate. i.e. it experiences
a deeper depreciation or appreciation. The e⁄ects of a positive and a negative impact are
exactly symmetric, both for disturbances on AH and on K. This is true despite the current
set-up, which is concerned with households￿love of variety (i.e. the price indexes include the
number of available products in the market, PH = n
1
1￿￿p(h) and PF = n
￿ 1
1￿￿p(f):)
One may expect to observe asymmetric responses of the economy in front of shocks
going in di⁄erent directions, due to the fact that an increase or a decrease of n and n￿
has a di⁄erent degree of impact on CPI and, consequently, on PK and P ￿
K. However, the
asymmetric disturbances generated in any price index are corrected by the movements of
the other.
Due to their structure, everything else equal, the optimal price indexes have asymmetric
responses in front of decreases or increases of the number of ￿rms:
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The slope of PH reduces with n. Hence, when a shock on Ai or on Ki -where i stands for
country H or F- causes an increase in n, PH experiences a stronger downwards movement
than the upwards reaction after a decrease of n. Moreover, for an equal variation of n, the
degree of volatility varies with the initial level of the number of ￿rms.
This may make one think that national and international macroeconomic volatilities
should be asymmetric after a positive or a negative shock on productivities. However, exactly
the same asymmetry is present in the price index of the foreign country, PF. Following a
shock in the home country, n￿ has a reaction in the opposite direction and, in general, smaller
than the response of n. Thanks to the symmetry between P and P ￿ and between PK and
P ￿
K, this counter-movement perfectly o⁄sets the asymmetric e⁄ect that, otherwise, one would
see in plots, and permits us to a¢ rm that volatilities do not depend on the direction of the
shock.
Going back to the volatility comparison between regimes, the di⁄erences are intuitively
clear. With ￿nancial autarky, a large depreciation makes imported goods expensive. Relative
to the integrated economy case, the lower depreciation helps to contain the cost of investment
that would be, otherwise, quite unsustainable in a ￿nancially closed economy. With the
￿nancial integration, however, investment is high and partially ￿nanced by foreign capital,
which covers part of the negative consequences of the depreciation. Under ￿nancial autarky,
instead, a large depreciation would force a huge decrease in investment; which would trigger
a worsening in both economies due to the reduction in the number of traded varieties and
the consequent increase of prices at home.12
12See the appendix for plots on compared volatilities.
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The relative variability of consumption depends on the kind of shock. If labour pro-
ductivity, AH, receives a shock, either positive or negative, consumption reacts more in the
economy with full integration, whereas it is the ￿nancial isolated economy which describes
a larger movement of consumption after a shock on capital.
The reason lies, once more, on the characteristics of investment funding. When the
shock is (positive) on AH, imports are more expensive in the RS because of the further
depreciation on the TOT. This is true both for consumption and capital goods. However,
in this case, foreign investors a⁄ord part of the extra cost of home capital and reallocate
some investment from the foreign less e¢ cient country to Home. This allows for a larger
adjustment in the extensive margin (n increases and n￿ decrease by more) under RS, which
moderates aggregate pro￿ts. Thus, the amount of dividends is smaller for this scenario and
households decide to take less and shorter vacations due to this wealth e⁄ect.
On the contrary, when the shock is negative on K (i.e. decreases), investment is already
cheap, so the size of the depreciation matters less for capital goods. In fact, n and n￿
volatilities are almost the same under both regimes (n is a bit more volatile for RS and
n￿ is slightly more variable for FA). Consequently, home pro￿ts vary similarly. Hence, the
di⁄erences in consumption volatility come from the level of depreciation: households lose less
purchasing power when they are in an isolated economy and this allows them to consume
more compared to the RS case.
3.4.3.2 Shocks on the productivity of production, AH
At ￿rst sight, a positive impact on labour productivity, AH, either in an economy with
full integration or in a ￿nancially isolated country, is almost the same for the country where
the shock occurs. However, the magnitude of the bene￿ts in terms of production per ￿rm
and in aggregate is lower in the latter. Per variety price volatility is extremely small after
the ￿rst period and needs few periods, compared to the rest of the variables, to get back to
the steady state value and it does not decrease as much. This is due to the faster return of
labour supply to its equilibrium level, which a⁄ects prices via individual production.
On the one hand, the volatility of the scale of production, ‘(h) is larger, although the
extensive margin gets a slightly higher peak (i.e. nFA > nPRS:) One would expect just the
opposite from the di⁄erences in the transitions for the cost of capital. PK does not decrease
as much as in the fully integrated markets. So, to build-up a new ￿rm is more expensive
now. It is clear that under ￿nancial autarky, the wealth e⁄ect is enhanced. Home pro￿ts
increase by more and the totality of them go to home households. This explains the extensive
margin movement and the fact that ‘(j), from the second period onwards, moves upwards
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less than in the case of full integration: households take more vacation or, put di⁄erently,
relative to the e¢ cient allocation with risk sharing, people work too little. When going out
from the Cole and Obstfeld case, both terms of trade and real exchange rate depreciates
by less. That makes the cost of the foreign goods relatively cheaper than with risk sharing.
Investment increases more than previously, which forces consumption to increase by less
due to the unavoidable trade-o⁄. Hence, households invest more and save more thanks to
the lower depreciation of RER, that makes imports cheaper than before. To sum up, the
integration of ￿nancial markets exacerbates the volatility in real terms.
For the foreign country, TOT and RER deteriorate. The wealth e⁄ect produces an
upward movement when the shock occurs. Firms work relatively more and there is a milder
destruction of varieties. This permits the foreign economy to maintain total output above
the steady state value during the transition, contrary to the adjustment in the integrated
economy. The non-linear transitions for consumption and wages can be explained by the
lower impact of the home shock on foreign wealth during the ￿rst period. In general, under
the ￿nancial autarky, both the substitution and wealth e⁄ects are smaller. This is the reason
for having all the variables a bit over the values of the previous case.
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A negative shock on K, i.e. a decrease in the quantity of capital required for the creation
of a new ￿rm, under ￿nancial isolation, generates a milder expansion of the extensive margin
in comparison with the RS case. p(f) goes up by more. Hence, the decrease on PK,
caused by the upwards movement in n, is slightly cushioned by the high p(f). In general,
the qualitative results are those of the fully integrated economy, with some variations on
volatilities that have already been mentioned.
Home investment stays below the steady state during all the transition period. This
di⁄ers from the case with RS, where the smaller e⁄ect on the extensive margin and the
faculty of relying on some foreign investment permits home investment (I = nt+1PKK) to
stay above the equilibrium level. Moreover, with FA, where the depreciation of terms of
trade is lower, home investment decreases further more due to the cheapness of creation.
Notice that the S ￿ I jumps down when the shock occurs and continues to decrease for
several periods. It is easy to realise that the reason lies on the steeper upwards transition of
investment in front of savings.
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3.4.4 Openness and Volatility
Although some comments on trade openness have been made in the text of the above
sections, a more detailed observation is o⁄ered here.
I start by comparing the closed economy with the ￿nancial autarky. On the one side,
the closed economy is, indeed, the extreme case in which trade openness is zero, as it is
￿ ￿nancial integration￿ , due to the inexistence of a foreign world. On the other side, the
￿nancial autarky scenario studied above is an economy which keeps the ￿nancial isolation
and introduces some international trade: 25% of the capital goods used in the building-up
of new ￿rms and 35% of the consumption goods are produced in a foreign country.
It is easy to see that volatility increases with trade in front of a shock on labour produc-
tivity: consumption, output, the number of active ￿rms... all aggregate variables experience
exacerbated reactions when the autarky is only on the ￿nancial sector. This is reason-
able: when another country exists, international transmission permits the foreign country
to receive part of the shock. Hence, for instance, when the shock is positive, they are also
bene￿ted and able to increase their demand, investment etc., providing an extra push to
both economies. On the contrary, when the shock occurs on the technology of creation, i.e.
on investment, the economy opened to trade is less volatile. Despite of the ￿nancial closure,
any shock at home motivates a depreciation (or appreciation) in terms of trade and the real
exchange rate. When the shock is on K, the depreciation is smaller because only investment
is cheaper. Instead, when AH improves, investment cost decreases as well as consumption.
Hence, consumption goods, which are produced by those cheaper ￿rms, are doubly e¢ ciently
generated. This engine motivates a further depreciation in RER that enhances volatility
and makes the di⁄erence. So, the transition from a completely isolated economy to another
one with some trade favours the increase (decrease) of volatility after a shock on labour
productivity (investment.)
For the second experiment, I ￿rst keep the average trade openness in consumption found
in EU-15 and check volatility behaviour for di⁄erent levels of trade in the capital goods
market under both ￿nancial structures. Afterwards, I set the same degree of openness for
both consumption and capital goods markets in order to value the e⁄ects of total openness
on volatility.
The results are quite ambiguous. Terms of trade experiences an exacerbated level of
volatility as total trade integration increases. This is true regardless of the ￿nancial regime
and the type of shock. However, when one keeps ￿ = 0:65 and observes several degrees
of trade in capital goods, neither the volatility of TOT nor the real exchange rate is clear.
Avoiding values too close to 50%, which would set RER = 1 and volatility to zero, changes
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on RER volatility seem to be slightly positive related to increases in capital goods trade,
whilst one keeps ￿ = 0:65, whereas it changes when accounting for total trade openness.
Finally, consumption shows a clear increment in volatility as international trade goes up.
Some authors consider the relevance of shock persistency as a determinant of the potential
impact of openness on macroeconomic volatilities. This model produces higher volatilities
the more persistent the shock is, regardless of the source.
3.5 Conclusion
The paper has addressed a crucial open debate on international macroeconomics: the ef-
fects of ￿nancial and trade openness on macroeconomic volatilities after two di⁄erent sources
of shocks: on labour productivity and on investment productivity. It has been completed
using a quantitative study and a NOEM model with ￿rms entry.
The main conclusions are the following:
￿ Both ￿nancial integration and trade openness seem to have a role on macroeconomic
volatilities.
￿ When the economy gains integration of capital markets, the real exchange rate and
the terms of trade, as well as output and investment, are a⁄ected by higher volatilities
after any kind of shock, whereas consumption variability increases only after a shock
on labour productivity. When the impact comes from the productivity of investment
(i.e. the technology of creation of new ￿rms or varieties), more ￿nancial integration
reduces consumption volatility.
￿ Trade openness has an unambiguous positive e⁄ect on consumption volatility, although
its implications for terms of trade and the real exchange rate are unclear when the
economy starts with some degree of trade, either under ￿nancial autarky or with full
integration. However, when one compares a closed economy with the ￿nancial autarky
case, the e⁄ect of the appearance of international trade generates an increase on all
variables￿volatilities after a shock on labour productivity, but a decrease after a shock
on capital.
The results of the present research show the key importance of the introduction of market
dynamics in the model, as well as the observation of the two types of shocks: on labour
productivity and on creation of ￿rms, when addressing the following question: what are the
interrelations between ￿nancial integration and trade openness with international volatilities
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and the transmission mechanism? Moreover, the ￿ndings are in line with recent empirical
literature: Kose et al (2003) on the side of ￿nancial integration and Easterly et al. (2001)
suggest that data reports results that are compatible with the present paper on the trade
openness side.





The four plots reported below show the transitions for the real exchange rate under
￿nancial autarky (FA) and full integration or risk sharing (RS), for the four di⁄erent shocks
which can impact the home country. Notice how the RS line takes always more extreme
values in its path back to the equilibrium, regardless of the direction of the shock (positive
or negative) or its source (shock on capital requirements or in technology productivity).
Moreover, the distances between FA and RS are identical within each of the two kinds of
shocks.
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The same occurs for terms of trade, consumption... volatilities.




The baseline case uses the following parametrization:
Parameter Notation Value
Home Bias in capital ￿ .75
Home bias in consumption ￿ .65
Discount factor ￿ .98
Technol, labour income share ￿ .66
Intratemp elast of substit ￿ 5
Home labour productivity at t=0 AH;0 1
Foreign labour productivity at t=0 AF;0 1
Disutility of labour ￿ 1.75
Home productivity creation t=0 ￿ K .7
Foreign productivity creation t=0 ￿ K￿ .7
Total population at home L 1
Total population abroad L￿ 1
Shock persistency for AH ￿ .95
Shock persistency for AF ￿
￿ .95
Shock persistency for K ￿K .95
Shock persistency for K￿ ￿K￿ .95
Portfolio diversi￿cation ￿ (1-￿)/(1+(2*￿-1)*(((￿-1)/￿)*￿-1))
To perform the experiments, I checked di⁄erent combinations of values for ￿ and ￿ from
.55 to .85; ￿ from 2 to 8; lower persistency of shocks and several levels of disutility of labour
and initial values for K and K￿.
The parameters for ￿ and ￿ are argued in the text and perfectly reasonable for actual
data. ￿ and ￿ take values standardly used in macro literature, as well as ￿ does. L and
L￿ are set to 1 to assume symmetric countries. This is a simpli￿cation that have important
implications for the results, as explained in the text. Finally, ￿ takes the optimal value
obtained in chapter II.
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/14337BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Bergin, P. and Corsetti, C. (March 2006.) "Towards a theory of ￿rm entry and stabiliza-
tion policy." NBER wp n.11821.
[2] Bekaert, G.; Campbell, R. H. and Lundblad, C. (July, 2005.) "Growth Volatility and
Financial Liberalization." (new version of) NBER WP 10560.
[3] Buch, C. (May, 2002.) "business Cycle Volatility and Globalization: a Survey." Kiel
Institute of World Economics WP 1107.
[4] Buch, C. and Pierdzioch, C. (2005.) "The Integration of Imperfect Financial Markets:
Implications for Business Cycle Volatility." Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 27, issue 7,
789-804.
[5] Buch, C. and Yener, S. (2005.) "Consumption Volatility and Financial Openness." Kiel
Institute for World Economics WP 1260.
[6] Calvo, G.A.; Izquierdo, A. and Mej￿a, L.F. (2004.) "On the Empirics of Sudden Stops:
the Relevance of Balance-Sheet E⁄ects." Inter-American Development Bank. Research
Department WP 509
[7] Cavallo, E. A. (2007.) "Output volatility and Openness to Trade: a Reassessment."
Inter-American Development Bank. WP 604.
[8] Corsetti, G. and Pesenti, P. (May 2005.) "The simple geometry of transmission and
stabilization in closed and open economy." NBER wp n.11341.
109
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/14337BIBLIOGRAPHY 110
[9] Corsetti, G.; Dedola, L. and Leduc, S. (November 2006). "International Risk Sharing
and the transmission of productivity shocks." (revised version). CEPR DP 4746).
[10] Corsetti, G.; Dedola, L. and Leduc, S. (November 2006.) "Productivity, External Bal-
ance and Exchange Rates: Evidence on the Transmission Mechanism Among G7 Coun-
tries."
[11] Corsetti, G. (November 2006.) "A Micro-founded reconsideration of the Theory of Op-
timum Currency Areas."
[12] Easterly, W.; Islam, R. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2001.) "Shaken and Stirred: Explaining
Growth Volatility." Annual World Bank Conference on Development Econoomics, ed. B.
Pleskovic and N Stern.
[13] Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2001.) "Trade in Capital Goods." NBER WP 8070.
[14] Evans, M.D.D. and Hnatkovska, V. (2006.) "Financial Integration, Macroeconomic
Volatility and Welfare." 7th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference (November 9-
10.)
[15] Gaulier. G.; Lahreche-Revil, A. and Mejean, I. (2006.) "Structural Determinants of the
Exchange-Rate Pass-Through," Working Papers 2006-03, CEPII research center.
[16] Hau, H. (August 2002.) "Real Exchange Rate Volatility and Economic Openness: The-
ory and Evidence." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol.34,3. Part 1 pp.611.
[17] Herwartz, H. and Weber, H. (2007.) "Exchange rate uncertainty and trade growth - a
comparison of linear and nonlinear (forecasting) models." SFB 649 DP 042.
[18] International Monetary Fund (2001.) "International Linkages: Three Perspectives."
World Economic Outlook. Chapter II. October. Washington D.C.
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/14337BIBLIOGRAPHY 111
[19] International Monetary Fund (2002.) World Economic Outlook, September (Washing-
ton.)
[20] King, R.G. and Rebelo, S. (1988.) "Production, Growth and Business Cycles: I. The
Basic Neoclassical Model" Journal of Monetary Economics, 22 (3:42).
[21] Kose, M.A.; Prasad, E. and Terrones, M. (2003.) "Financial Integration and Macroeco-
nomic Volatility." IMF WP/03/50.
[22] Neaime, S. (2005.) "Financial Market Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility in the
MENA Region: An Empirical Investigation," Review of Middle East Economics and Fi-
nance: Vol. 3 : No. 3, Article 5.
[23] Padma, G. (1985.) "E⁄ects of Exchange Rate Volatility on Trade." IMF sta⁄paper, 32,
475-512.
[24] Razin, A. and Rose, A. (1992.) "Business Cycle Volatility and Openness: an Exploratory
Cross-Section Analysis." NBER WP 4208.
[25] Robertson, D. and Wickens, M. R. (1997.) "Measuring Real and Nominal Macroeco-
nomic Shocks and their International Transmission under Di⁄erent Monetary Systems."
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 59 (1), 5￿ 28.
[26] Tille, C. (2005.) "Financial Integration and the Wealth E⁄ect of Exchange Rate Fluc-
tuations." Federal Reserve Bank of New York Sta⁄ Report 226.
Arespa Castelló, Marta (2008), International Transmission, Firm Entry and Risk Sharing
European University Institute
DOI:￿10.2870/14337